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Abstract
We provide a model to investigate the tension between information aggregation and
spread of misinformation in large societies (conceptualized as networks of agents com-
municating with each other). Each individual holds a belief represented by a scalar.
Individuals meet pairwise and exchange information, which is modeled as both individ-
uals adopting the average of their pre-meeting beliefs. When all individuals engage in
this type of information exchange, the society will be able to effectively aggregate the
initial information held by all individuals. There is also the possibility of misinformation,
however, because some of the individuals are “forceful,” meaning that they influence the
beliefs of (some) of the other individuals they meet, but do not change their own opinion.
The paper characterizes how the presence of forceful agents interferes with information
aggregation. Under the assumption that even forceful agents obtain some information
(however infrequent) from some others (and additional weak regularity conditions), we
first show that beliefs in this class of societies converge to a consensus among all in-
dividuals. This consensus value is a random variable, however, and we characterize its
behavior. Our main results quantify the extent of misinformation in the society by either
providing bounds or exact results (in some special cases) on how far the consensus value
can be from the benchmark without forceful agents (where there is efficient information
aggregation). The worst outcomes obtain when there are several forceful agents and
forceful agents themselves update their beliefs only on the basis of information they
obtain from individuals most likely to have received their own information previously.
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1 Introduction
Individuals form beliefs on various economic, political and social variables (“state”)
based on information they receive from others, including friends, neighbors and cowork-
ers as well as local leaders, news sources and political actors. A key tradeoff faced by
any society is whether this process of information exchange will lead to the formation
of more accurate beliefs or to certain systematic biases and spread of misinformation.
A famous idea going back to Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (now often emphasized in the
context of ideas related to “wisdom of the crowds”) encapsulates the idea that exchange
of dispersed information will enable socially beneficial aggregation of information. How-
ever, as several examples ranging from the effects of the Swift Boat ads during the 2004
presidential campaign to the beliefs in the Middle East that 9/11 was a US or Israeli
conspiracy illustrate, in practice social groups are often swayed by misleading ads, media
outlets, and political leaders, and hold on to incorrect and inaccurate beliefs.
A central question for social science is to understand the conditions under which
exchange of information will lead to the spread of misinformation instead of aggregation
of dispersed information. In this paper, we take a first step towards developing and
analyzing a framework for providing answers to this question. While the issue of misin-
formation can be studied using Bayesian models, non-Bayesian models appear to provide
a more natural starting point.1 Our modeling strategy is therefore to use a non-Bayesian
model, which however is reminiscent of a Bayesian model in the absence of “forceful”
agents (who are either trying to mislead or influence others or are, for various rational
or irrational reasons, not interested in updating their opinions).
We consider a society envisaged as a social network of n agents, communicating and
exchanging information. Specifically, each agent is interested in learning some under-
lying state θ ∈ R and receives a signal xi(0) ∈ R in the beginning. We assume that
θ = 1/n
∑n
i=1 xi(0), so that information about the relevant state is dispersed and this
information can be easily aggregated if the agents can communicate in a centralized or
decentralized fashion.
Information exchange between agents takes place as follows: Each individual is “rec-
ognized” according to a Poisson process in continuous time and conditional on this event,
meets one of the individuals in her social neighborhood according to a pre-specified
stochastic process. We think of this stochastic process as representing an underlying
social network (for example, friendships, information networks, etc.). Following this
meeting, there is a potential exchange of information between the two individuals, af-
fecting the beliefs of one or both agents. We distinguish between two types of individuals:
regular or forceful. When two regular agents meet, they update their beliefs to be equal
to the average of their pre-meeting beliefs. This structure, tough non-Bayesian, has a
1In particular, misinformation can arise in a Bayesian model if an agent (receiver) is unsure of the
type of another agent (sender) providing her with information and the sender happens to be of a type
intending to mislead the receiver. Nevertheless, this type of misinformation will be limited since if the
probability that the sender is of the misleading type is high, the receiver will not change her beliefs
much on the basis of the sender’s communication.
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simple and appealing interpretation and ensures the convergence of beliefs to the un-
derlying state θ when the society consists only of regular agents.2 In contrast, when
an agent meets a forceful agent, this may result in the forceful agent “influencing” his
beliefs so that this individual inherits the forceful agent’s belief except for an ǫ weight
on his pre-meeting belief.3 Our modeling of forceful agents is sufficiently general to nest
both individuals (or media outlets) that purposefully wish to influence others with their
opinion or individuals who, for various reasons, may have more influence with some
subset of the population.4 A key assumption of our analysis is that even forceful agents
engage in some updating of their beliefs (even if infrequently) as a result of exchange
of information with their own social neighborhoods. This assumption captures the in-
tuitive notion that “no man is an island” and thus receives some nontrivial input from
the social context in which he or she is situated.5 The influence pattern of social agents
superimposed over the social network can be described by directed links, referred to
as forceful links, and creates a richer stochastic process, representing the evolution of
beliefs in the society. Both with and without forceful agents, the evolution of beliefs
can be represented by a Markov chain and our analysis will exploit this connection. We
will frequently distinguish the Markov chain representing the evolution of beliefs and
the Markov chain induced by the underlying social network (i.e., just corresponding to
the communication structure in the society, without taking into account the influence
pattern) and properties of both will play a central role in our results.
Our objective is to characterize the evolution of beliefs and quantify the effect of
forceful agents on public opinion in the context of this model. Our first result is that,
despite the presence of forceful agents, the opinion of all agents in this social network
converges to a common, tough stochastic, value under weak regularity conditions. More
formally, each agent’s opinion converges to a value given by π′x(0), where x(0) is the
vector of initial beliefs and π is a random vector. Our measure of spread of misinforma-
tion in the society will be π¯′x(0) − θ = ∑ni=1(π¯i − 1/n)xi(0), where π¯ is the expected
value of π and π¯i denotes its ith component. The greater is this gap, the greater is
the potential for misinformation in this society. Moreover, this formula also makes it
clear that π¯i− 1/n gives the excess influence of agent i. Our strategy will be to develop
2The appealing interpretation is that this type of averaging would be optimal if both agents had
beliefs drawn from a normal distribution with mean equal to the underlying state and equal precision.
This interpretation is discussed in detail in De Marzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel [16] in a related context.
3When ǫ = 1/2, then the individual treats the forceful agent just as any other regular agent (is
not influenced by him over and above the information exchange) and the only difference from the
interaction between two regular agents is that the forceful agent himself does not update his beliefs. All
of our analysis is conducted for arbitrary ǫ, so whether forceful agents are also “influential” in pairwise
meetings is not important for any of our findings.
4What we do not allow are individuals who know the underlying state and try to convince others of
some systematic bias relative to the underlying state, though the model could be modified to fit this
possibility as well.
5When there are several forceful agents and none of them ever change their opinion, then it is
straightforward to see that opinions in this society will never settle into a “stationary” distribution.
While this case is also interesting to study, it is significantly more difficult to analyze and requires a
different mathematical approach.
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bounds on the spread of misinformation in the society (as defined above) and on the
excess influence of each agent for general social networks and also provide exact results
for some special networks.
We provide three types of results. First, using tools from matrix perturbation the-
ory,6 we provide global and general upper bounds on the extent of misinformation as a
function of the properties of the underlying social network. In particular, the bounds
relate to the spectral gap and the mixing properties of the Markov chain induced by the
social network. Recall that a Markov chain is fast-mixing if it converges rapidly to its
stationary distribution. It will do so when it has a large spectral gap, or loosely speak-
ing, when it is highly connected and possesses many potential paths of communication
between any pair of agents. Intuitively, societies represented by fast-mixing Markov
chains have more limited room for misinformation because forceful agents themselves
are influenced by the weighted opinion of the rest of the society before they can spread
their own (potentially extreme) views. A corollary of these results is that for a spe-
cial class of societies, corresponding to “expander graphs”, misinformation disappears
in large societies provided that there is a finite number of forceful agents and no forceful
agent has global impact.7 In contrast, the extent of misinformation can be substantial
in slow-mixing Markov chains, also for an intuitive reason. Societies represented by
such Markov chains would have a high degree of partitioning (multiple clusters with
weak communication in between), so that forceful agents receive their information from
others who previously were influenced by them, ensuring that their potentially extreme
opinions are never moderated.8
Our second set of results exploit the local structure of the social network in the
neighborhood of each forceful agent in order to provide a tighter characterization of the
extent of misinformation and excess influence. Fast-mixing and spectral gap properties
are global (and refer to the properties of the overall social network representing meeting
and communication patterns among all agents). As such, they may reflect properties of
a social network far from where the forceful agents are located. If so, our first set of
bounds will not be tight. To redress this problem, we develop an alternative analysis
using mean (first) passage times of the Markov chain and show how it is not only the
global properties of the social network, but also the local social context in which forceful
agents are situated that matter. For example, in a social network with a single dense
cluster and several non-clustered pockets, it matters greatly whether forceful links are
located inside the cluster or not. We illustrate this result sharply by first focusing
6In particular, we decompose the transition matrix of the Markov chain into a doubly stochastic
matrix, representing the underlying social network, and a remainder matrix, representing a directed
influence graph. Despite the term “perturbation,” this remainder matrix need not be “small” in any
sense.
7Expander graphs are graphs whose spectral gap remains bounded away from zero as the number
of nodes tends to infinity. Several networks related to the Internet correspond to expander graphs; see,
for example, Mihail, Papadimitriou, and Saberi [27].
8This result is related to Golub and Jackson [20], where they relate learning to homophily properties
of the social network.
LIDS Report 2812 5
on graphs with forceful essential edges, that is, graphs representing societies in which
a single forceful link connects two otherwise disconnected components. This, loosely
speaking, represents a situation in which a forceful agent, for example a media outlet or
a political party leader, obtains all of its (or his or her) information from a small group
of individuals and influences the rest of the society. In this context, we establish the
surprising result that all members of the small group will have the same excess influence,
even though some of them may have much weaker links or no links to the forceful agent.
This result is an implication of the society having a (single) forceful essential edge and
reflects the fact that the information among the small group of individuals who are the
source of information of the forceful agent aggregates rapidly and thus it is the average
of their beliefs that matter. We then generalize these results and intuitions to more
general graphs using the notion of information bottlenecks.
Our third set of results are more technical in nature, and provide new conceptual
tools and algorithms for characterizing the role of information bottlenecks. In particular,
we introduce the concept of relative cuts and present several new results related to
relative cuts and how these relate to mean first passage times. For our purposes, these
new results are useful because they enable us to quantify the extent of local clustering
around forceful agents. Using the notion of relative cuts, we develop new algorithms
based on graph clustering that enable us to provide improved bounds on the extent of
misinformation in beliefs as a function of information bottlenecks in the social network.
Our paper is related to a large and growing learning literature. Much of this literature
focuses on various Bayesian models of observational or communication-based learning;
for example Bikchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [8], Banerjee [6], Smith and Sorensen
[36], [35], Banerjee and Fudenberg [7], Bala and Goyal [4], [5], Gale and Kariv [18], and
Celen and Kariv [12], [11]. These papers develop models of social learning either using
a Bayesian perspective or exploiting some plausible rule-of-thumb behavior. Acemoglu,
Dahleh, Lobel and Ozdaglar [1] provide an analysis of Bayesian learning over general
social networks. Our paper is most closely related to DeGroot [15], DeMarzo, Vayanos
and Zwiebel [16] and Golub and Jackson [21], [20], who also consider non-Bayesian
learning over a social network represented by a connected graph.9 None of the papers
mentioned above consider the issue of the spread of misinformation (or the tension
between aggregation of information and spread of misinformation), though there are
close parallels between Golub and Jackson’s and our characterizations of influence.10 In
9An important distinction is that in contrast to the “averaging” model used in these papers, we
have a model of pairwise interactions. We believe that this model has a more attractive economic
interpretation, since it does not have the feature that neighbors’ information will be averaged at each
date (even though the same information was exchanged the previous period). In contrast, in the pairwise
meeting model (without forceful agents), if a pair meets two periods in a row, in the second meeting
there is no information to exchange and no change in beliefs takes place.
10In particular, Golub and Jackson [20] characterize the effects of homophily on learning and influence
in two different models of learning in terms of mixing properties and the spectral gap of graphs. In one
of their learning models, which builds on DeGroot [15], DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel [16] and Golub
and Jackson [21], homophily has negative effects on learning (and speed of learning) for reasons related
to our finding that in slow-mixing graphs, misinformation can spread more.
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addition to our focus, the methods of analysis here, which develop bounds on the extent
of misinformation and provide exact characterization of excess influence in certain classes
of social networks, are entirely new in the literature and also rely on the developments
of new results in the analysis of Markov chains.
Our work is also related to other work in the economics of communication, in par-
ticular, to cheap-talk models based on Crawford and Sobel [14] (see also Farrell and
Gibbons [17] and Sobel [37]), and some recent learning papers incorporating cheap-talk
games into a network structure (see Ambrus and Takahashi [3], Hagenbach and Koessler
[22], and Galeotti, Ghiglino and Squintani [19]).
In addition to the papers on learning mentioned above, our paper is related to work
on consensus, which is motivated by different problems, but typically leads to a similar
mathematical formulation (Tsitsiklis [38], Tsitsiklis, Bertsekas and Athans [39], Jad-
babaie, Lin and Morse [25], Olfati-Saber and Murray [29], Olshevsky and Tsitsiklis [30],
Nedic´ and Ozdaglar [28]). In consensus problems, the focus is on whether the beliefs
or the values held by different units (which might correspond to individuals, sensors or
distributed processors) converge to a common value. Our analysis here does not only
focus on consensus, but also whether the consensus happens around the true value of
the underlying state. There are also no parallels in this literature to our bounds on
misinformation and characterization results.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce our model of
interaction between the agents and describe the resulting evolution of individual beliefs.
We also state our assumptions on connectivity and information exchange between the
agents. Section 3 presents our main convergence result on the evolution of agent beliefs
over time. In Section 4, we provide bounds on the extent of misinformation as a function
of the global network parameters. Section 5 focuses on the effects of location of forceful
links on the spread of misinformation and provides bounds as a function of the local
connectivity and location of forceful agents in the network. Section 6 contains our
concluding remarks.
Notation and Terminology: A vector is viewed as a column vector, unless clearly
stated otherwise. We denote by xi or [x]i the i
th component of a vector x. When xi ≥ 0
for all components i of a vector x, we write x ≥ 0. For a matrix A, we write Aij or [A]ij
to denote the matrix entry in the ith row and jth column. We write x′ to denote the
transpose of a vector x. The scalar product of two vectors x, y ∈ Rm is denoted by x′y.
We use ‖x‖2 to denote the standard Euclidean norm, ‖x‖2 =
√
x′x. We write ‖x‖∞ to
denote the max norm, ‖x‖∞ = max1≤i≤m |xi|. We use ei to denote the vector with ith
entry equal to 1 and all other entries equal to 0. We denote by e the vector with all
entries equal to 1.
A vector a is said to be a stochastic vector when ai ≥ 0 for all i and
∑
i ai = 1.
A square matrix A is said to be a (row) stochastic matrix when each row of A is a
stochastic vector. The transpose of a matrix A is denoted by A′. A square matrix A is
said to be a doubly stochastic matrix when both A and A′ are stochastic matrices.
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2 Belief Evolution
2.1 Description of the Environment
We consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents interacting over a social network. Each
agent i starts with an initial belief about an underlying state, which we denote by
xi(0) ∈ R. Agents exchange information with their neighbors and update their beliefs.
We assume that there are two types of agents; regular and forceful. Regular agents
exchange information with their neighbors (when they meet). In contrast, forceful agents
influence others disproportionately.
We use an asynchronous continuous-time model to represent meetings between agents
(also studied in Boyd et al. [9] in the context of communication networks). In particular,
we assume that each agent meets (communicates with) other agents at instances defined
by a rate one Poisson process independent of other agents. This implies that the meeting
instances (over all agents) occur according to a rate n Poisson process at times tk, k ≥ 1.
Note that in this model, by convention, at most one node is active (i.e., is meeting
another) at a given time. We discretize time according to meeting instances (since these
are the relevant instances at which the beliefs change), and refer to the interval [tk, tk+1)
as the kth time slot. On average, there are n meeting instances per unit of absolute time
(see Boyd et al. [9] for a precise relation between these instances and absolute time).
Suppose that at time (slot) k, agent i is chosen to meet another agent (probability
1/n). In this case, agent i will meet agent j ∈ N with probability pij . Following a
meeting between i and j, there is a potential exchange of information. Throughout,
we assume that all events that happen in a meeting are independent of any other event
that happened in the past. Let xi(k) denote the belief of agent i about the underlying
state at time k. The agents update their beliefs according to one of the following three
possibilities.
(i) Agents i and j reach pairwise consensus and the beliefs are updated according to
xi(k + 1) = xj(k + 1) =
xi(k) + xj(k)
2
.
We denote the conditional probability of this event (conditional on i meeting j)
as βij.
(ii) Agent j influences agent i, in which case for some ǫ ∈ (0, 1/2], beliefs change
according to
xi(k + 1) = ǫxi(k) + (1− ǫ)xj(k), and xj(k + 1) = xj(k). (1)
In this case beliefs of agent j do not change.11 We denote the conditional prob-
ability of this event as αij , and refer to it as the influence probability. Note that
11We could allow the self belief weight ǫ to be different for each agent i. This generality does not
change the results or the economic intuitions, so for notational convenience, we assume this weight to
be the same across all agents.
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we allow ǫ = 1/2, so that agent i may be treating agent j just as a regular agent,
except that agent j himself does not change his beliefs.
(iii) Agents i and j do not agree and stick to their beliefs, i.e.,
xi(k + 1) = xi(k), and xj(k + 1) = xj(k).
This event has probability γij = 1− βij − αij.
Any agent j for whom the influence probability αij > 0 for some i ∈ N is referred
to as a forceful agent. Moreover, the directed link (j, i) is referred to as a forceful link.12
As discussed in the introduction, we can interpret forceful agents in multiple different
ways. First, forceful agents may correspond to community leaders or news media, will
have a disproportionate effect on the beliefs of their followers. In such cases, it is natural
to consider ǫ small and the leaders or media not updating their own beliefs as a result
of others listening to their opinion. Second, forceful agents may be indistinguishable
from regular agents, and thus regular agents engage in what they think is information
exchange, but forceful agents, because of stubbornness or some other motive, do not
incorporate the information of these agents in their own beliefs. In this case, it may be
natural to think of ǫ as equal to 1/2. The results that follow remain valid with either
interpretation.
The influence structure described above will determine the evolution of beliefs in
the society. Below, we will give a more precise separation of this evolution into two
components, one related to the underlying social network (communication and meeting
structure), and the other to influence patterns.
2.2 Assumptions
We next state our assumptions on the belief evolution model among the agents. We
have the following assumption on the agent meeting probabilities pij .
Assumption 1. (Meeting Probabilities)
(a) For all i, the probabilities pii are equal to 0.
(b) For all i, the probabilities pij are nonnegative for all j and they sum to 1 over j,
i.e.,
pij ≥ 0 for all i, j,
n∑
j=1
pij = 1 for all i.
12We refer to directed links/edges as links and undirected ones as edges.
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Assumption 1(a) imposes that “self-communication” is not a possibility, though this
is just a convention, since, as stated above, we allow disagreement among agents, i.e.,
γij can be positive. We let P denote the matrix with entries pij. Under Assumption
1(b), the matrix P is a stochastic matrix.13
We next impose a connectivity assumption on the social network. This assumption is
stated in terms of the directed graph (N , E), where E is the set of directed links induced
by the positive meeting probabilities pij, i.e.,
E = {(i, j) | pij > 0}. (2)
Assumption 2. (Connectivity) The graph (N , E) is strongly connected, i.e., for all
i, j ∈ N , there exists a directed path connecting i to j with links in the set E .
Assumption 2 ensures that every agent “communicates” with every other agent (pos-
sibly through multiple links). This is not an innocuous assumption, since otherwise the
graph (N , E) (and the society that it represents) would segment into multiple non-
communicating parts. Though not innocuous, this assumption is also natural for several
reasons. First, the evidence suggests that most subsets of the society are not only con-
nected, but are connected by means of several links (e.g., Watts [40] and Jackson [24]),
and the same seems to be true for indirect linkages via the Internet. Second, if the soci-
ety is segmented into multiple non-communication parts, the insights here would apply,
with some modifications, to each of these parts.
Let us also use dij to denote the length of the shortest path from i to j and d to
denote the maximum shortest path length between any i, j ∈ N , i.e.,
d = max
i,j∈N
dij . (3)
In view of Assumption 2, these are all well-defined objects.
Finally, we introduce the following assumption which ensures that there is positive
probability that every agent (even if he is forceful) receives some information from an
agent in his neighborhood.
Assumption 3. (Interaction Probabilities) For all (i, j) ∈ E , the sum of the averaging
probability βij and the influence probability αij is positive, i.e.,
βij + αij > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E .
The connectivity assumption (Assumption 2) ensures that there is a path from any
forceful agent to other agents in the network, implying that for any forceful agent i, there
is a link (i, j) ∈ E for some j ∈ N . Then the main role of Assumption 3 is to guarantee
that even the forceful agents at some point get information from the other agents in
13That is, its row sums are equal to 1.
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the network.14 This assumption captures the idea that “no man is an island,” i.e., even
the beliefs of forceful agents are affected by the beliefs of the society. In the absence of
this assumption, any society consisting of several forceful agents may never settle into
a stationary distribution of beliefs. While this is an interesting situation to investigate,
it requires a very different approach. Since we view the “no man is an island” feature
plausible, we find Assumption 3 a useful starting point.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold.
2.3 Evolution of Beliefs: Social Network and Influence Matri-
ces
We can express the preceding belief update model compactly as follows. Let x(k) =
(x1(k), . . . , xn(k)) denote the vector of agent beliefs at time k. The agent beliefs are
updated according to the relation
x(k + 1) = W (k)x(k), (4)
where W (k) is a random matrix given by
W (k) =


Aij ≡ I − (ei−ej)(ei−ej)
′
2
with probability pijβij/n,
Jij ≡ I − (1− ǫ)ei(ei − ej)′ with probability pijαij/n,
I with probability pijγij/n,
(5)
for all i, j ∈ N . The preceding belief update model implies that the matrix W (k) is a
stochastic matrix for all k, and is independent and identically distributed over all k.
Let us introduce the matrices
Φ(k, s) = W (k)W (k − 1) · · ·W (s+ 1)W (s) for all k and s with k ≥ s, (6)
with Φ(k, k) = W (k) for all k. We will refer to the matrices Φ(k, s) as the transition
matrices. We can now write the belief update rule (4) as follows: for all s and k with
k ≥ s ≥ 0 and all agents i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
xi(k + 1) =
n∑
j=1
[Φ(k, s)]ij xj(s). (7)
Given our assumptions, the random matrix W (k) is identically distributed over all
k, and thus we have for some nonnegative matrix W˜ ,
E[W (k)] = W˜ for all k ≥ 0. (8)
14This assumption is stated for all (i, j) ∈ E , thus a forceful agent i receives some information from
any j in his “neighborhood”. This is without any loss of generality, since we can always set pij = 0 for
those j’s that are in i’s neighborhood but from whom i never obtains information.
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The matrix, W˜ , which we refer to as the mean interaction matrix, represents the evolu-
tion of beliefs in the society. It incorporates elements from both the underlying social
network (which determines the meeting patterns) and the influence structure. In what
follows, it will be useful to separate these into two components, both for our mathemat-
ical analysis and to clarify the intuitions. For this purpose, let us use the belief update
model (4)-(5) and write the mean interaction matrix W˜ as follows:15
W˜ =
1
n
∑
i,j
pij
[
βijAij + αijJij + γijI
]
=
1
n
∑
i,j
pij
[
(1− γij)Aij + γijI
]
+
1
n
∑
i,j
pijαij
[
Jij −Aij
]
,
where Aij and Jij are matrices defined in Eq. (5), and the second inequality follows from
the fact that βij = 1− αij − γij for all i, j ∈ N . We use the notation
T =
1
n
∑
i,j
pij
[
(1− γij)Aij + γijI
]
, D =
1
n
∑
i,j
pijαij
[
Jij − Aij
]
, (9)
to write the mean interaction matrix, W˜ , as
W˜ = T +D. (10)
Here, the matrix T only depends on meeting probabilities (matrix P ) except that
it also incorporates γij (probability that following a meeting no exchange takes place).
We can therefore think of the matrix T as representing the underlying social network
(friendships, communication among coworkers, decisions about which news outlets to
watch, etc.), and refer to it as the social network matrix. It will be useful below to
represent the social interactions using an undirected (and weighted) graph induced by
the social network matrix T . This graph is given by (N ,A), where A is the set of
undirected edges given by
A =
{
{i, j} | Tij > 0
}
, (11)
and the weight we of edge e = {i, j} is given by the entry Tij = Tji of the matrix T . We
refer to this graph as the social network graph.
The matrix D, on the other hand, can be thought of as representing the influence
structure in the society. It incorporates information about which individuals and links
are forceful (i.e., which types of interactions will lead to one individual influencing the
other without updating his own beliefs). We refer to matrix D as the influence matrix.
It is also useful to note for interpreting the mathematical results below that T is a
doubly stochastic matrix, while D is not. Therefore, Eq. (10) gives a decomposition of
the mean connectivity matrix W˜ into a doubly stochastic and a remainder component,
and enables us to use tools from matrix perturbation theory (see Section 4).
15In the sequel, the notation
∑
i,j will be used to denote the double sum
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1.
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3 Convergence
In this section, we provide our main convergence result. In particular, we show that
despite the presence of forceful agents, with potentially very different opinions at the
beginning, the society will ultimately converge to a consensus, in which all individuals
share the same belief. This consensus value of beliefs itself is a random variable. We
also provide a first characterization of the expected value of this consensus belief in
terms of the mean interaction matrix (and thus social network and influence matrices).
Our analysis essentially relies on showing that iterates of Eq. (4), x(k), converge to a
consensus with probability one, i.e., x(k) → x¯e, where x¯ is a scalar random variable
that depends on the initial beliefs and the random sequence of matrices {W (k)}, and e
is the vector of all one’s. The proof uses two lemmas which are presented in Appendix
B.
Theorem 1. The sequences {xi(k)}, i ∈ N , generated by Eq. (4) converge to a consen-
sus belief, i.e., there exists a scalar random variable x¯ such that
lim
k→∞
xi(k) = x¯ for all i with probability one.
Moreover, the random variable x¯ is a convex combination of initial agent beliefs, i.e.,
x¯ =
n∑
j=1
πjxj(0),
where π = [π1, . . . , πn] is a random vector that satisfies πj ≥ 0 for all j, and
∑n
j=1 πj = 1.
Proof. By Lemma 9 from Appendix B, we have
P
{
[Φ(s+ n2d− 1, s)]ij ≥ η
d
2
ǫn
2−1, for all i, j
}
≥
(
ηd
2
)n2
for all s ≥ 0,
where Φ(s + n2d − 1, s) is a transition matrix [cf. Eq. (6)], d is the maximum shortest
path length in graph (N , E) [cf. Eq. (3)], ǫ is the self belief weight against a forceful
agent [cf. Eq. (1)], and η is a positive scalar defined in Eq. (45). This relation implies
that over a window of length n2d, all entries of the transition matrix Φ(s + n2d − 1, s)
are strictly positive with positive probability, which is uniformly bounded away from 0.
Thus, we can use Lemma 6 (from Appendix A) with the identifications
H(k) = W (k), B = n2d, θ =
ηd
2
ǫn
2−1.
Letting
M(k) = max
i∈N
xi(k), m(k) = min
i∈N
xi(k),
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this implies that nη
d
2
ǫn
2−1 ≤ 1 and for all s ≥ 0,
P
{
M(s+ n2d)−m(s+ n2d) ≤ (1− nηd/2 ǫn2−1)(M(s)−m(s))
}
≥
(
ηd
2
)n2
.
Moreover, by the stochasticity of the matrixW (k), it follows that the sequence {M(k)−
m(k)} is nonincreasing with probability one. Hence, we have for all s ≥ 0
E
[
M(s+n2d)−m(s+n2d)
]
≤
[
1−
(
ηd
2
)n2
+
(
ηd
2
)n2
(1− nηd/2 ǫn2−1)
]
(M(s)−m(s)),
from which, for any k ≥ 0, we obtain
E
[
M(k)−m(k)
]
≤
[
1−
(
ηd
2
)n2
+
(
ηd
2
)n2
(1− nηd/2 ǫn2−1)
]⌊ k
n2d
⌋
(M(0)−m(0)).
This implies that
lim
k→∞
M(k)−m(k) = 0 with probability one.
The stochasticity of the matrix W (k) further implies that the sequences {M(k)} and
{m(k)} are bounded and monotone and therefore converges to the same limit, which we
denote by x¯. Since we have
m(k) ≤ xi(k) ≤M(k) for all i and k ≥ 0,
it follows that
lim
k→∞
xi(k) = x¯ for all i with probability one,
establishing the first result.
Letting s = 0 in Eq. (7), we have for all i
xi(k) =
n∑
j=1
[Φ(k − 1, 0)]ij xj(0) for all k ≥ 0. (12)
From the previous part, for any initial belief vector x(0), the limit
lim
k→∞
xi(k) =
n∑
j=1
lim
k→∞
[Φ(k − 1, 0)]ij xj(0)
exists and is independent of i. Hence, for any h, we can choose x(0) = eh, i.e., xh(0) = 1
and xj(0) = 0 for all j 6= h, implying that the limit
lim
k→∞
[Φ(k − 1, 0)]ih
exists and is independent of i. Denoting this limit by πh and using Eq. (12), we obtain
the desired result, where the properties of the vector π = [π1, . . . , πn] follows from
the stochasticity of matrix Φ(k, 0) for all k (implying the stochasticity of its limit as
k →∞).
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The key implication of this result is that, despite the presence of forceful agents,
the society will ultimately reach a consensus. Though surprising at first, this result is
intuitive in light of our “no man is an island” assumption (Assumption 3). However, in
contrast to “averaging models” used both in the engineering literature and recently in
the learning literature, the consensus value here is a random variable and will depend
on the order in which meetings have taken place. The main role of this result for us
is that we can now conduct our analysis on quantifying the extent of the spread of
misinformation by looking at this consensus value of beliefs.
The next theorem characterizes E[x¯] in terms of the limiting behavior of the matrices
W˜ k as k goes to infinity.
Theorem 2. Let x¯ be the limiting random variable of the sequences {xi(k)}, i ∈ N
generated by Eq. (4) (cf. Theorem 1). Then we have:
(a) The matrix W˜ k converges to a stochastic matrix with identical rows π¯ as k goes
to infinity, i.e.,
lim
k→∞
W˜ k = eπ¯′.
(b) The expected value of x¯ is given by a convex combination of the initial agent values
xi(0), where the weights are given by the components of the probability vector π¯,
i.e.,
E[x¯] =
n∑
i=1
π¯ixi(0) = π¯
′x(0).
Proof. (a) This part relies on the properties of the mean interaction matrix established
in Appendix B. In particular, by Lemma 7(a), the mean interaction matrix W˜ is a
primitive matrix. Therefore, the Markov Chain with transition probability matrix W˜ is
regular (see Section 4.1 for a definition). The result follows immediately from Theorem
3(a).
(b) From Eq. (7), we have for all k ≥ 0
x(k) = Φ(k − 1, 0)x(0).
Moreover, since x(k)→ x¯e as k →∞, we have
E[x¯e] = E[ lim
k→∞
x(k)] = lim
k→∞
E[x(k)],
where the second equality follows from the Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem
(see [31]). Combining the preceding two relations and using the assumption that the
matrices W (k) are independent and identically distributed over all k ≥ 0, we obtain
E[x¯e] = lim
k→∞
E[Φ(k − 1, 0)x(0)] = lim
k→∞
W˜ kx(0),
which in view of part (a) implies
E[x¯] = π¯′x(0).
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Combining Theorem 1 and Theorem 2(a) (and using the fact that the results hold for
any x(0)), we have π¯ = E[π]. The stationary distribution π¯ is crucial in understanding
the formation of opinions since it encapsulates the weight given to each agent (forceful
or regular) in the (limiting) mean consensus value of the society. We refer to the vector
π¯ as the consensus distribution corresponding to the mean interaction matrix W˜ and its
component π¯i as the weight of agent i.
It is also useful at this point to highlight how consensus will form around the correct
value in the absence of forceful agents. Let {x(k)} be the belief sequence generated by
the belief update rule of Eq. (4). When there are no forceful agents, i.e. αij = 0 for all
i, j, then the interaction matrix W (k) for all k is either equal to an averaging matrix
Aij for some i, j or equal to the identity matrix I; hence, W (k) is a doubly stochastic
matrix. This implies that the average value of x(k) remains constant at each iteration,
i.e.,
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi(k) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi(0) for all k ≥ 0.
Theorem 1 therefore shows that when there are no forceful agents, the sequences xi(k)
for all i, converge to the average of the initial beliefs with probability one, aggregating
information. We state this result as a simple corollary.
Corollary 1. Assume that there are no forceful agents, i.e., αij = 0 for all i, j ∈ N . We
have
lim
k→∞
xi(k) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi(0) = θ with probability one.
Therefore, in the absence of forceful agents, the society is able to aggregate informa-
tion effectively. Theorem 2 then also implies that in this case π = π¯i = 1/n for all i (i.e.,
beliefs converge to a deterministic value), so that no individual has excess influence.
These results no longer hold when there are forceful agents. In the next section, we
investigate the effect of the forceful agents and the structure of the social network on
the extent of misinformation and excess influence of individuals.
4 Global Limits on Misinformation
In this section, we are interested in providing an upper bound on the expected value of
the difference between the consensus belief x¯ (cf. Theorem 1) and the true underlying
state, θ (or equivalently the average of the initial beliefs), i.e.,
E [x¯− θ] = E[x¯]− θ =
∑
i∈N
(
π¯i − 1
n
)
xi(0), (13)
(cf. Theorem 2). Our bound relies on a fundamental theorem from the perturbation
theory of finite Markov Chains. Before presenting the theorem, we first introduce some
terminology and basic results related to Markov Chains.
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4.1 Preliminary Results
Consider a finite Markov Chain with n states and transition probability matrix T .16 We
say that a finite Markov chain is regular if its transition probability matrix is a primitive
matrix, i.e., there exists some integer k > 0 such that all entries of the power matrix
T k are positive. The following theorem states basic results on the limiting behavior of
products of transition matrices of Markov Chains (see Theorems 4.1.4, 4.1.6, and 4.3.1
in Kemeny and Snell [26]).
Theorem 3. Consider a regular Markov Chain with n states and transition probability
matrix T .
(a) The kth power of the transition matrix T , T k, converges to a stochastic matrix T∞
with all rows equal to the probability vector π, i.e.,
lim
k→∞
T k = T∞ = eπ′,
where e is the n-dimensional vector of all ones.
(b) The probability vector π is a left eigenvector of the matrix T , i.e.,
π′T = π′ and π′e = 1.
The vector π is referred to as the stationary distribution of the Markov Chain.
(c) The matrix Y = (I − T + T∞)−1 − T∞ is well-defined and is given by
Y =
∞∑
k=0
(T k − T∞).
The matrix Y is referred to as the fundamental matrix of the Markov Chain.
The following theorem provides an exact perturbation result for the stationary dis-
tribution of a regular Markov Chain in terms of its fundamental matrix. The theorem
is based on a result due to Schweitzer [32] (see also Haviv and Van Der Heyden [23]).
Theorem 4. Consider a regular Markov Chain with n states and transition probability
matrix T . Let π denote its unique stationary distribution and Y denote its fundamental
matrix. Let D be an n×n perturbation matrix such that the sum of the entries in each
row is equal to 0, i.e.,
n∑
j=1
[D]ij = 0 for all i.
16We use the same notation as in (10) here, given the close connection between the matrices introduced
in the next two theorems and the ones in (10).
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Assume that the perturbed Markov chain with transition matrix Tˆ = T +D is regular.
Then, the perturbed Markov chain has a unique stationary distribution πˆ, and the matrix
I −DY is nonsingular. Moreover, the change in the stationary distributions, ρ = πˆ−π,
is given by
ρ′ = π′DY (I −DY )−1.
4.2 Main Results
This subsection provides bounds on the difference between the consensus distribution
and the uniform distribution using the global properties of the underlying social network.
Our method of analysis will rely on the decomposition of the mean interaction matrix
W˜ given in (10) into the social network matrix T and the influence matrix D. Recall
that T is doubly stochastic.
The next theorem provides our first result on characterizing the extent of misinfor-
mation and establishes an upper bound on the l∞-norm of the difference between the
stationary distribution π¯ and the uniform distribution 1
n
e, which, from Eq. (13), also
provides a bound on the deviation between expected beliefs and the true underlying
state, θ.
Theorem 5. (a) Let π¯ denote the consensus distribution. The l∞-norm of the differ-
ence between π¯ and 1
n
e is given by
∥∥∥π¯ − 1
n
e
∥∥∥
∞
≤ 1
1− δ
∑
i,j pijαij
2n
,
where δ is a constant defined by
δ = (1− nχd) 1d ,
χ = min
(i,j)∈E
{
1
n
[
pij
1− γij
2
+ pji
1− γji
2
]}
,
and d is the maximum shortest path length in the graph (N , E) [cf. Eq. (3)].
(b) Let x¯ be the limiting random variable of the sequences {xi(k)}, i ∈ N generated
by Eq. (4) (cf. Theorem 1). We have
∣∣∣E[x¯]− 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi(0)
∣∣∣ ≤ 1
1− δ
∑
i,j pijαij
2n
‖x(0)‖∞.
Proof. (a) Recall that the mean interaction matrix can be represented as
W˜ = T +D,
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[cf. Eq. (10)], i.e., W˜ can be viewed as a perturbation of the social network matrix T
by influence matrix D. By Lemma 10(a), the stationary distribution of the Markov
chain with transition probability matrix T is given by the uniform distribution 1
n
e. By
the definition of the matrix D [cf. Eq. (9)] and the fact that the matrices Aij and Jij
are stochastic matrices with all row sums equal to one [cf. Eq. (5)], it follows that the
sum of entries of each row of D is equal to 0. Moreover, by Theorem 2(a), the Markov
Chain with transition probability matrix W˜ is regular and has a stationary distribution
π¯. Therefore, we can use the exact perturbation result given in Theorem 4 to write the
change in the stationary distributions 1
n
e and π¯ as
(
π¯ − 1
n
e
)′
=
1
n
e′DY (I −DY )−1, (14)
where Y is the fundamental matrix of the Markov Chain with transition probability
matrix T , i.e.,
Y =
∞∑
k=0
(T k − T∞),
with T∞ = 1
n
ee′ [cf. Theorem 3(c)]. Algebraic manipulation of Eq. (14) yields
(
π¯ − 1
n
e
)′
= π¯′DY,
implying that ∥∥∥π¯ − 1
n
e
∥∥∥
∞
≤ ‖DY ‖∞, (15)
where ‖DY ‖∞ denotes the matrix norm induced by the l∞ vector norm.
We next obtain an upper bound on the matrix norm ‖DY ‖∞. By the definition of
the fundamental matrix Y , we have
DY =
∞∑
k=0
D(T k − T∞) =
∞∑
k=0
DT k, (16)
where the second equality follows from the fact that the row sums of matrix D is equal
to 0 and the matrix T∞ is given by T∞ = 1
n
ee′.
Given any z(0) ∈ Rn with ‖z(0)‖∞ = 1, let {z(k)} denote the sequence generated by
the linear update rule
z(k) = T kz(0) for all k ≥ 0.
Then, for all k ≥ 0, we have
DT kz(0) = Dz(k),
which by the definition of the matrix D [cf. Eq. (9)] implies
DT kz(0) =
1
n
∑
i,j
pijαijz
ij(k), (17)
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where the vector zij(k) ∈ Rn is defined as
zij(k) = [Jij −Aij ]z(k) for all i, j, and k ≥ 0.
By the definition of the matrices Jij and Aij [cf. Eq. (5)], the entries of the vector z
ij(k)
are given by
[zij(k)]l =


(
1
2
− ǫ
)
(zj(k)− zi(k)) if l = i,
1
2
(zj(k)− zi(k)) if l = j,
0 otherwise.
(18)
This implies that the vector norm ‖zij(k)‖∞ can be upper-bounded by
‖zij(k)‖∞ ≤ 1
2
[
max
l∈N
zl(k)−min
l∈N
zl(k)
]
for all i, j, and k ≥ 0.
Defining M(k) = maxl∈N zl(k) and m(k) = minl∈N zl(k) for all k ≥ 0, this implies that
‖zij(k)‖∞ ≤ 1
2
(M(k)−m(k)) ≤ 1
2
δk (M(0)−m(0)) for all i, j, and k ≥ 0,
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 10(b) in Appendix C. Combining the
preceding relation with Eq. (17), we obtain
‖DT kz(0)‖∞ ≤ 1
2n
(∑
i,j
pijαij
)
δk (M(0)−m(0)).
By Eq. (16), it follows that
‖DY z(0)‖∞ ≤
∞∑
k=0
‖DT kz(0)‖∞ ≤
∞∑
k=0
1
2n
(∑
i,j
pijαij
)
δk (M(0)−m(0)) ≤
∑
i,j pijαij
2n(1− δ) ,
where to get the last inequality, we used the fact that 0 ≤ δ < 1 and M(0)−m(0) ≤ 1,
which follows from ‖z(0)‖∞ = 1. Since z(0) is an arbitrary vector with ‖z(0)‖∞ = 1,
this implies that
‖DY ‖∞ = min
{z | ‖z‖∞=1}
‖DY z‖∞ ≤ 1
2n(1− δ)
(∑
i,j
pijαij
)
.
Combining this bound with Eq. (15), we obtain
∥∥∥π¯ − 1
n
e
∥∥∥
∞
≤ 1
1− δ
∑
i,j pijαij
2n
,
establishing the desired relation.
(b) By Lemma 2(b), we have
E[x¯] = π¯′x(0).
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This implies that
∣∣∣E[x¯]− 1
n
n∑
i=1
xi(0)
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣π¯′x(0)− 1
n
e′x(0)
∣∣∣ ≤ ∥∥∥π¯ − 1
n
e
∥∥∥
∞
‖x(0)‖∞.
The result follows by combining this relation with part (a).
Before providing the intuition for the preceding theorem, we provide a related bound
on the l2-norm of the difference between π¯ and the uniform distribution
1
n
e in terms of
the second largest eigenvalue of the social network matrix T , and then return to the
intuition for both results.
Theorem 6. Let π¯ denote the consensus distribution (cf. Lemma 2). The l2-norm of
the difference between π¯ and 1
n
e is given by
∥∥∥π¯ − 1
n
e
∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
1− λ2(T )
∑
i,j pijαij
n
,
where λ2(T ) is the second largest eigenvalue of the matrix T defined in Eq. (9).
Proof. Following a similar argument as in the proof of Theorem 5, we obtain∥∥∥π¯ − 1
n
e
∥∥∥
2
≤ ‖DY ‖2, (19)
where ‖DY ‖2 is the matrix norm induced by the l2 vector norm. To obtain an upper
bound on the matrix norm ‖DY ‖2, we consider an initial vector z(0) ∈ Rn with ‖z(0)‖2 =
1 and the sequence generated by
z(k + 1) = Tz(k) for all k ≥ 0.
Then, for all k ≥ 0, we have
DT kz(0) =
1
n
∑
i,j
pijαijz
ij(k), (20)
where the entries of the vector zij(k) are given by Eq. (18). We can provide an upper
bound on the ‖zij(k)‖22 as
‖zij(k)‖22 =
1
2
(zj(k)− zi(k))2 = 1
2
(
(zj(k)− z¯) + (z¯ − zi(k))
)2
,
where z¯ = 1
n
∑n
l=1 zl(k) for all k (note that since T is a doubly stochastic matrix, the
average of the entries of the vector z(k) is the same for all k). Using the relation
(a+ b)2 ≤ 2(a2 + b2) for any scalars a and b, this yields
‖zij(k)‖22 ≤
n∑
l=1
(zl(k)− z¯)2 = ‖z(k)− z¯e‖22. (21)
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We have
z(k + 1)− z¯e = Tz(k)− z¯e = T
(
z(k)− z¯e
)
,
where the second equality follows from the stochasticity of the matrix T , implying that
Te = e. The vector z(k) − z¯e is orthogonal to the vector e, which is the eigenvector
corresponding to the largest eigenvalue λ1 = 1 of matrix T (note that λ1 = 1 since T
is a primitive and stochastic matrix). Hence, using the variational characterization of
eigenvalues, we obtain
‖z(k + 1)− z¯e‖22 ≤ (z(k)− z¯e)′ T 2 (z(k)− z¯e) ≤ λ2(T )2‖z(k)− z¯e‖22.
where λ2(T ) is the second largest eigenvalue of matrix T , which implies
‖z(k)− z¯e‖22 ≤
(
λ2(T )
2
)k
‖z(0)− z¯e‖22 ≤ λ2(T )2k.
Here the second inequality follows form the fact that ‖z(0)‖2 = 1 and z¯ is the average
of the entries of vector z(0). Combining the preceding relation with Eq. (21), we obtain
‖zij(k)‖2 ≤ λ2(T )k for all k ≥ 0.
By Eq. (20), this implies that
‖DT kz(0)‖2 = 1
n
(∑
i,j
pijαij
)
λ2(T )
k for all k ≥ 0.
Using the definition of the fundamental matrix Y , we obtain
‖DY z(0)‖2 ≤
∞∑
k=0
‖DT kz(0)‖2 ≤
∞∑
k=0
1
n
(∑
i,j
pijαij
)
λ2(T )
k =
1
1− λ2(T )
∑
i,j pijαij
n
,
for any vector z(0) with ‖z(0)‖2 = 1. Combined with Eq. (19), this yields the desired
result.
Theorem 6 characterizes the variation of the stationary distribution in terms of the
average influence,
P
i,j pijαij
n
, and the second largest eigenvalue of the social network
matrix T , λ2(T ). As is well known, the difference 1 − λ2(T ), also referred to as the
spectral gap, governs the rate of convergence of the Markov Chain induced by the social
network matrix T to its stationary distribution (see [10]). In particular, the larger
1 − λ2(T ) is, the faster the kth power of the transition probability matrix converges to
the stationary distribution matrix (cf. Theorem 3). When the Markov chain converges
to its stationary distribution rapidly, we say that the Markov chain is fast-mixing.17
17We use the terms “spectral gap of the Markov chain” and “spectral gap of the (induced) graph”,
and “fast-mixing Markov chain” and “fast-mixing graph” interchangeably in the sequel.
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In this light, Theorem 6 shows that, in a fast-mixing graph, given a fixed average influ-
ence
P
i,j pijαij
n
, the consensus distribution is “closer” to the underlying θ = 1
n
∑n
i=1 xi(0)
and the extent of misinformation is limited. This is intuitive. In a fast-mixing social
network graph, there are several connections between any pair of agents. Now for any
forceful agent, consider the set of agents who will have some influence on his beliefs. This
set itself is connected to the rest of the agents and thus obtains information from the
rest of the society. Therefore, in a fast-mixing graph (or in a society represented by such
a graph), the beliefs of forceful agents will themselves be moderated by the rest of the
society before they spread widely. In contrast, in a slowly-mixing graph, we can have a
high degree of clustering around forceful agents, so that forceful agents get their (already
limited) information intake mostly from the same agents that they have influenced. If
so, there will be only a very indirect connection from the rest of the society to the beliefs
of forceful agents and forceful agents will spread their information widely before their
opinions also adjust. As a result, the consensus is more likely to be much closer to the
opinions of forceful agents, potentially quite different from the true underlying state θ.
This discussion also gives intuition for Theorem 5 since the constant δ in that result
is closely linked to the mixing properties of the social network matrix and the social
network graph. In particular, Theorem 5 clarifies that δ is related to the maximum
shortest path and the minimum probability of (indirect) communication between any
two agents in the society. These two notions also crucially influence the spectral gap
1− λ2(Tn), which plays the key role in Theorem 6.
These intuitions are illustrated in the next example, which shows how in a certain
class of graphs, misinformation becomes arbitrarily small as the social network grows.
Example 1. (Expander Graphs) Consider a sequence of social network graphs Gn =
(Nn,An) induced by symmetric n × n matrices Tn [cf. Eq. (11)]. Assume that this
sequence of graphs is a family of expander graphs, i.e., there exists a positive constant
γ > 0 such that the spectral gap 1 − λ2(Tn) of the graph is uniformly bounded away
from 0, independent of the number of nodes n in the graph, i.e.,
γ ≤ 1− λ2(Tn) for all n,
(see [13]) As an example, Internet has been shown to be an expander graph under the
preferential connectivity random graph model (see [27] and [24]). Expander graphs have
high connectivity properties and are fast mixing.
We consider the following influence structure superimposed on the social network
graph Gn. We define an agent j to be locally forceful if he influences a constant number of
agents in the society, i.e., his total influence, given by
∑
i pijαij , is a constant independent
of n. We assume that there is a constant number of locally forceful agents. Let π¯n denote
the stationary distribution of the Markov Chain with transition probability matrix given
by the mean interaction matrix W˜ [cf. Eq. (8)]. Then, it follows from Theorem 6 that
∥∥∥π¯n − 1
n
e
∥∥∥
2
→ 0 as n→∞.
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Figure 1: Impact of location of forceful agents on the stationary distribution (a) Misin-
formation over the bottleneck (b) Misinformation inside a cluster
This shows that if the social network graph is fast-mixing and there is a constant number
of locally forceful agents, then the difference between the consensus belief and the average
of the initial beliefs vanishes. Intuitively, in expander graphs, as n grows large, the set of
individuals who are the source of information of forceful agents become highly connected,
and thus rapidly inherit the average of the information of the rest of the society. Provided
that the number of forceful agents and the impact of each forceful agent do not grow
with n, then their influence becomes arbitrarily small as n increases.
5 Connectivity of Forceful Agents and Misinforma-
tion
The results provided so far exploit the decomposition of the evolution of beliefs into
the social network component (matrix T ) and the influence component (matrix D).
This decomposition does not exploit the interactions between the structure of the social
network and the location of forceful agents within it. For example, forceful agents located
in different parts of the same social network will have different impacts on the extent
of misinformation in the society, but our results so far do not capture this aspect. The
following example illustrates these issues in a sharp way.
Example 2. Consider a society consisting of six agents and represented by the (undi-
rected) social network graph shown in Figure 1. The weight of each edge {i, j} is given
by
[T ]ij =
1
2n
(pij + pji),
where, for illustration, we choose pij to be inversely proportional to the degree of node
i, for all j. The self-loops are not shown in Figure 1.
We distinguish two different cases as illustrated in Figure 1. In each case, there is
a single forceful agent and α = 1/2. This is represented by a directed forceful link.
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The two cases differ by the location of the forceful link, i.e., the forceful link is over the
bottleneck of the connectivity graph in part (a) and inside the left cluster in part (b).
The corresponding consensus distributions can be computed as
πa =
1
6
(1.25, 1.25, 1.25, 0.75, 0.75, 0.75)′, πb =
1
6
(0.82, 1.18, 1, 1, 1, 1)′.
Even though the social network matrix T (and the corresponding graph) is the same in
both cases, the consensus distributions are different. In particular, in part (a), each agent
in the left cluster has a higher weight compared to the agents in the right cluster, while
in part (b), the weight of all agents, except for the forceful and influenced agents, are
equal and given by 1/6. This is intuitive since when the forceful link is over a bottleneck,
the misinformation of a forceful agent can spread and influence a larger portion of the
society before his opinions can be moderated by the opinions of the other agents.
This example shows how the extent of spread of misinformation varies depending
on the location of the forceful agent. The rest of this section provides a more detailed
analysis of how the location and connectivity of forceful agents affect the formation of
opinions in the network. We proceed as follows. First, we provide an alternative exact
characterization of excess influence using mean first passage times. We then introduce
the concept of essential edges, similar to the situation depicted in Example 2, and provide
sharper exact results for graphs in which forceful links coincide with essential edges. We
then generalize these notions to more general networks by introducing the concept of
information bottlenecks, and finally, we develop new techniques for determining tighter
upper bounds on excess influence by using ideas from graph clustering.
5.1 Characterization in Terms of Mean First Passage Times
Our next main result provides an exact characterization of the excess influence of agent
i in terms of the mean passage times of the Markov chain with transition probability
matrix T . This result, and those that follow later in this section, will be useful both to
provide more informative bounds on the extent of misinformation and also to highlight
the sources of excess influence for certain agents in the society.
We start with presenting some basic definitions and relations (see Chapter 2 of [2]).
Definition 1. Let (Xt, t = 0, 1, 2, . . .) denote a discrete-time Markov chain. We denote
the first hitting time of state i by
Ti = inf {t ≥ 0 | Xt = i}.
We define the mean first passage time from state i to state j as
mij = E[Tj | X0 = i],
and the mean commute time between state i and state j as mij + mji. Moreover, we
define the mean first return time to a particular state i as
m+i = E[T
+
i | X0 = i],
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where
T+i = inf {t ≥ 1 | Xt = i}.
Lemma 1. Consider a Markov chain with transition matrix Z and stationary distribu-
tion π. We have:
(i) The mean first return time from state i to i is given by m+i = 1/πi.
(ii) The mean first passage time from i to j is given by
mij =
Yjj − Yij
πj
,
where Y =
∑∞
k=0(Z
k − Z∞) is the fundamental matrix of the Markov chain.
We use the relations in the preceding lemma between the fundamental matrix of
a Markov chain and the mean first passage times between states, to provide an exact
characterization of the excess influence of agent k.
Theorem 7. Let π¯ denote the consensus distribution. We have:
(a) For every agent k
π¯k − 1
n
=
1
2n2
∑
i,j
pijαij
(
(1− 2ǫ)π¯i + π¯j
)(
mik −mjk
)
.
(b) Let AI denote the set of edges over which there is a forceful link, i.e.,
AI =
{
{i, j} ∈ A | αij > 0 or αji > 0
}
.
Assume that for any {i, j}, {k, l} ∈ AI , we have {i, j} ∩ {k, l} = ∅. Then,
π¯k − 1
n
=
1
n3
∑
i,j
pijαij(1− ǫ)
1− ζij/n2 (mik −mjk), (22)
where
ζij = ζji =
[(1
2
+ ǫ
)
pijαij − 1
2
pjiαji
]
mij −
[1
2
pijαij −
(1
2
+ ǫ
)
pjiαji
]
mji,
and mij is the mean first passage time from state i to state j of a Markov chain with
transition matrix given by the social network matrix T [cf. Eq. (9)].
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Proof. (a) Following the same line of argument as in the proof of Theorem 5, we can
use the perturbation results of Theorem 4 to write the excess influence of agent k as
π¯k − 1
n
= π¯′D[Y ]k, (23)
where Y is the fundamental matrix of a Markov chain with transition matrix T . Using
(5), and the definition of D in (9) we have
[
D[Y ]k
]
l
=
∑
i,j
pijαij
n


(
1
2
− ǫ) (Yjk − Yik) if l = i,
1
2
(Yjk − Yik) if l = j,
0 otherwise.
Hence, we can write right-hand side of Eq. (23) as follows:
π¯k − 1
n
=
∑
i,j
pijαij
2n
(
(1− 2ǫ)π¯i + π¯j
)(
Yjk − Yik
)
. (24)
By Lemma 1(ii), we have
Yjk − Yik = 1
n
(mik −mjk), (25)
where Y is the fundamental matrix of the Markov chain with transition matrix T . The
desired result follows by substituting the preceding relation in Eq. (24).
(b) In view of the assumption that all edges in AI are pairwise disjoint, the perturbation
matrix D decomposes into disjoint blocks, i.e.,
D =
∑
{i,j}∈AI
Dij +Dji, where Dij =
pijαij
n
[
Jij −Aij
]
. (26)
For each edge {i, j} ∈ AI , it is straightforward to show that(
(Dij +Dji)Y
)2
=
(
1− ζij
n2
)
(Dij +Dji)Y.
Using the decomposition in Eq. (26) and the preceding relation, it can be seen that
DY (I −DY )−1 =
∑
i,j
(
1− ζij
n2
)−1
DijY.
Combined with the exact perturbation result in Theorem 4, this implies that
π¯k − 1
n
=
1
n
[e′DY (I −DY )−1]k
=
1
n
∑
i,j
(
1− ζij
n2
)−1
[e′DijY ]k
=
∑
i,j
pijαij
n2
(1− ǫ)
1− ζij/n2 (Yjk − Yik).
The main result follows by substituting Eq. (25) in the above equation.
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Part (a) of Theorem 7 provides an exact expression for the excess influence of agent
k as a function of the mean first passage times from agent (or state) k to the forceful and
influenced agents. The excess influence of each agent therefore depends on the relative
distance of that agent to the forceful and the influenced agent. To provide an intuition
for this result, let us consider the special case in which there is a single forceful link
(j, i) in the society (i.e., only one pair of agents i and j with αij > 0) and thus a single
forceful agent j. Then for any agent k, their only source of excess influence can come
from their (potentially indirect) impact on the beliefs of the forceful agent j. This is why
mjk, which, loosely speaking, measures the distance between j and k, enters negatively
in to the expression for the excess influence of agent k. In addition, any agent who
meets (communicates) with agent i with a high probability will be indirectly influenced
by the opinions of the forceful agent j. Therefore, the excess influence of agent k is
increasing in his distance to i, thus in mik. In particular, in the extreme case where
mik is small, agent k will have negative excess influence (because he is very close to the
heavily “influenced” agent i) and in the polar extreme, where mjk is small, he will have
positive excessive influence (because his views will be quickly heard by the forceful agent
j). The general expression in part (a) of the theorem simply generalizes this reasoning
to general social networks with multiple forceful agents and several forceful links.
Part (b) provides an alternative expression [cf. Eq. (22)], with a similar intuition
for the special case in which all forceful links are disjoint. The main advantage of the
expression in part (b) is that, though more complicated, is not in terms of the expected
consensus distribution π¯ (which is endogenous). Disjoint forceful link property in part
(b) is also useful because it enables us to isolate the effects of the forceful agents. The
parameter ζij in Eq. (22) captures the asymmetry between the locations of agents i and
j in the underlying social network graph. Although the expression for excess influence
in part (a) of Theorem 7 is a function of the consensus distribution π¯, each element of
this vector (distribution) can be bounded by 1 to obtain an upper bound for the excess
influence of agent k.
Using the results in Theorem 7, the difference between the consensus distributions
discussed in Example 2 can be explained as follows. In Example 2(a), the mean first
passage time from agent 4 to any agent k in the left cluster is strictly larger than that
of agent 3 to agent k, because every path from agent 4 to the left cluster should pass
through agent 3. Therefore, m4k > m3k for k = 1, 2, 3, and agents in the left cluster have
a higher consensus weight. In Example 2(b), due to the symmetry of the social network
graph, the mean first passage times of agents 1 and 2 to any agent k 6= 1, 2 are the same,
hence establishing by Theorem 7 the uniform weights in the consensus distribution.
In the following we study the effect of the location of a forceful link on the excess
influence of each agent by characterizing the relative mean first passage time |mik−mjk|,
in terms of the properties of the social network graph.
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5.2 Forceful Essential Edges
In this subsection, we provide an exact characterization of the excess influence of agent k
explicitly in terms of the properties of the social network graph. We focus on the special
case when the undirected edge between the forceful and the influenced agent is essential
for the social network graph, in the sense that without this edge the graph would be
disconnected. We refer to such edges as forceful essential edges. Graphs with forceful
essential edges approximate situations in which a forceful agent, for example a media
outlet or political leader, itself obtains all of its information from a tightknit community.
We first give the definition of an essential edge of an undirected graph.
Definition 2. Let G = (N ,A) be an undirected graph. An edge {i, j} ∈ A is an
essential edge of the graph G = (N ,A) if its removal would partition the set of nodes
into two disjoint sets N(i, j) ⊂ N with i ∈ N(i, j), and N(j, i) ⊂ N with j ∈ N(j, i).
The following lemma provides an exact characterization of the mean first passage
time from state i to state j, where i and j are the end nodes of an essential edge {i, j}.
Lemma 2. Consider a Markov chain with a doubly stochastic transition probability
matrix T . Let {i, j} be an essential edge of the social network graph induced by matrix
T .
(a) We have
mij =
|N(i, j)|
Tij
.
(b) For every k ∈ N(j, i),
mik −mjk = mij .
Proof. Consider a Markov chain over the set of states N ′ = N(i, j)∪{j}, with transition
probabilities
Tˆkl = Tkl, for all k 6= l.
For the new chain with stationary distribution πˆ we have
πˆj =
Tij
Tˆ
=
Tij
|N(i, j)|+ Tij ,
where Tˆ is the total edge weight in the new chain.
Since {i, j} is essential, every path from i to j should pass through {i, j}. Moreover,
because of equivalent transition probabilities between the new Markov chain and the
original one on N ′, the mean passage time mij of the original Markov chain is equal to
mean passage time mˆij of the new chain. On the other hand, for the new chain, we can
write the mean return time to j as
mˆ+j = 1 + mˆij = 1 +mij ,
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which implies [cf. Lemma 1(i)]
mij =
1
πˆj
− 1 = |N(i, j)|
Tij
.
The second part of the claim follows from the fact that all of the paths from i to k
must pass through {i, j}, because it is the only edge connecting N(i, j) to N(j, i). Thus,
we conclude
mik = mij +mjk.
We use the relation in Lemma 2 to study the effect of a single forceful link over an
essential edge on the excess influence of each agent.
Theorem 8. Let π¯ denote the consensus distribution. Assume that there exists a single
pair {i, j} for which the influence probability αij > 0. Assume that the edge {i, j} is an
essential edge of the social network graph. Then, we have for all k,
π¯k − 1
n
=
2
n2
θij(1− ǫ)
1− θij
n
(
(1 + 2ǫ)|N(i, j)| − |N(j, i)|
) Ψij(k),
where
θij =
pijαij
pij(1− γij) + pji(1− γji) ,
and
Ψij(k) =
{ |N(i, j)|, k ∈ N(j, i),
−|N(j, i)|, k ∈ N(i, j).
Proof. Since edge {i, j} is essential, by Lemma 2 we have for every k ∈ N(j, i)
mik −mjk = mij = |N(i, j)|
Tij
=
2n|N(i, j)|
pij(1− γij) + pji(1− γji) ,
Similarly, for every k ∈ N(i, j), we obtain
mik −mjk = −mji = − 2n|N(j, i)|
pij(1− γij) + pji(1− γji) .
Combining the preceding relations, we can write for the relative mean passage time
mik − mjk = 2nθijpijαijΨij(k). Since (i, j) is the only forceful link, we can apply Theorem
7(b) to get
π¯k − 1
n
=
(
2
n2
)
θij(1− ǫ)
1− ζij/n2 ·Ψij(k),
where ζij is given by
ζij =
pijαij
2
[
(1 + 2ǫ)mij −mji
]
.
Combining the above relations with Lemma 2(i) establishes the desired result.
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Theorem 8 shows that if two clusters of agents, e.g., two communities, are connected
via an essential edge over which there is a forceful link, then the excess influence of
all agents within the same cluster are equal (even when the cluster does not have any
symmetry properties). This implies that the opinions of all agents that are in the same
cluster as the forceful agent affect the consensus opinion of the society with the same
strength. This property is observed in part (a) of Example 2, in which edge {3,4} is
an essential edge. Intuitively, all of the agents in that cluster will ultimately shape
the opinions of the forceful agent and this is the source of their excess influence. The
interesting and surprising feature is that they all have the same excess influence, even if
only some of them are directly connected to the forceful agent. Loosely speaking, this
can be explained using the fact that, in the limiting distribution, it is the consensus
among this cluster of agents that will impact the beliefs of the forceful agent, and since
within this cluster there are no other forceful agents, the consensus value among them
puts equal weight on each of them (recall Corollary 1).
5.3 Information Bottlenecks
We now extend the ideas in Theorem 8 to more general societies. We observed in
Example 2 and Section 5.2 that influence over an essential edge can have global effects
on the consensus distribution since essential edges are “bottlenecks” of the information
flow in the network. In this subsection we generalize this idea to influential links over
bottlenecks that are not necessarily essential edges as defined in Definition 2. Our goal
is to study the impact of influential links over bottlenecks on the consensus distribution.
To achieve this goal, we return to the characterization in Theorem 7, which was in
terms of first mean passage times, and then provide a series of (successively tighter)
upper bounds on the key term (mik − mjk) in Eq. (22) in this theorem. Our first
bound on this object will be in terms of the minimum normalized cut of a Markov chain
(induced by an undirected weighted graph), which is introduced in the next definition.
We will use the term cut of a Markov Chain (or cut of an undirected graph) to denote
a partition of the set of states of a Markov chain (or equivalently the nodes of the
corresponding graph) into two sets.
Definition 3. Consider a Markov chain with set of states N , symmetric transition
probability matrix Z, and stationary distribution π. The minimum normalized cut
value (or conductance) of the Markov chain, denoted by ρ, is defined as
ρ = inf
S⊂N
Q(S, Sc)
π(S)π(Sc)
, (27)
where Q(A,B) =
∑
i∈A,j∈B πiZij , and π(S) =
∑
i∈S πi. We refer to the cut that achieves
the minimum in this optimization problem as the minimum normalized cut.
The objective in the optimization problem in (27) is the (normalized) conditional
probability that the Markov chain makes a transition from a state in set S to a state
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in set Sc given that the initial state is in S. The minimum normalized cut therefore
characterizes how fast the Markov chain will escape from any part of the state space,
hence is an appropriate measure of information bottlenecks or the mixing time of the
underlying graph. Clearly, the minimum normalized cut value is larger in more connected
graphs.
The next lemma provides a relation between the maximum mean commute time of
a Markov chain (induced by an undirected graph) and the minimum normalized cut of
the chain, which is presented in Section 5.3 of Aldous and Fill [2]. This result will then
be used in the next theorem to provide an improved bound on the excess influences by
using the fact that |mik −mjk| ≤ maxi,j {mij , mji} (see, in particular, proof of Theorem
9).
Lemma 3. Consider an n-state Markov chain with transition matrix Z and stationary
distribution π. Let ρ denote the minimum normalized cut value of the Markov chain
(cf. Definition 3). The maximum mean commute time satisfies the following relation:
max
i,j
{mij +mji} ≤ 4(1 + log n)
ρmin πk
. (28)
We use the preceding relation together with our characterization of excess influence
in terms of mean first passage times in Theorem 7 to obtain a tighter upper bound on the
l∞ norm of excess influence than in Theorem 5. This result, which is stated next, both
gives a more directly interpretable limit on the extent of misinformation in the society
and also shows the usefulness of the characterization in terms of mean first passage times
in Theorem 7.
Theorem 9. Let π¯ denote the consensus distribution. Then, we have∥∥∥π¯ − 1
n
e
∥∥∥
∞
≤
∑
i,j
2pijαij
n
(1 + log n
ρ
)
,
where ρ is the minimum normalized cut value of the Markov chain with transition
probability matrix given by the social network matrix T (cf. Definition 3).
Proof. By Theorem 7 we have for every k∣∣∣π¯k − 1
n
∣∣∣ = ∑
i,j
pijαij
2n2
((1− 2ǫ)π¯i + π¯j)
∣∣mik −mjk∣∣
≤
∑
i,j
pijαij
2n2
∣∣mik −mjk∣∣
≤
∑
i,j
pijαij
2n2
max{mij , mji} (29)
≤
∑
i,j
pijαij
2n2
max
i,j
{mij +mji}
≤
∑
i,j
2pijαij
n
(1 + log n
ρ
)
,
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where (29) holds because mik ≤ mij+mjk, and mjk ≤ mji+mik, and the last inequality
follows from Eq. (28), and the fact that π = 1
n
e.
One advantage of the result in this theorem is that the bound is in terms of ρ, the
minimum normalized cut of the social network graph. As emphasized in Definition 3,
this notion is related to the strength of (indirect) communication links in the society.
Although the bound in Theorem 9 is tighter than the one we provided in Theorem 5, it
still leaves some local information unexploited because it focuses on the maximum mean
commute times between all states of a Markov chain. The following example shows how
this bound may be improved further by focusing on the mean commute time between
the forceful and the influenced agents.
Example 3. (Barbell graph) The barbell graph consists of two complete graphs each
with n1 nodes that are connected via a path that consists of n2 nodes (cf. Figure 2).
Consider the asymptotic behavior
n→∞, n1/n→ ν, n2/n→ 1− 2ν,
where n = 2n1 + n2 denotes the total number of nodes in the barbell graph, and 0 <
ν < 1
2
. The mean first passage time from a particular node in the left bell to a node in
the right bell is O(n3) as n→∞, while the mean passage time between any two nodes
in each bell is O(n) (See Chapter 5 of [2] for exact results). Consider a situation where
there is a single forceful link in the left bell.
The minimum normalized cut for this example is given by cut C0, with normalized
cut value O(1/n), which captures the bottleneck in the global network structure. Since
the only forceful agent is within the left bell in this example, we expect the flow of
information to be limited by cuts that separate the forceful and the influenced agent,
and partition the left bell. Since the left bell is a complete graph, the cuts associated
with this part of the graph will have higher normalized cut values, thus yielding tighter
bounds on the excess influence of the agents. In what follows, we consider bounds in
terms of “relative cuts” in the social network graph that separate forceful and influenced
agents in order to capture bottlenecks in the spread of misinformation (for example, cuts
C1, C2, and C3 in Figure 2).
5.4 Relative Cuts
The objective of this section is to improve our characterization of the extent of misin-
formation in terms of information bottlenecks. To achieve this objective, we introduce
a new concept, relative cuts, and then show how this new concept is useful to derive im-
proved upper bounds on the excess influence of different individuals and on the extent of
misinformation. Our strategy is to develop tighter bounds on the mean commute times
between the forceful and influenced agents in terms of relative cut values. Together with
Theorem 7, this enables us to provide bounds on the excess influence as a function of
the properties of the social network graph and the location of the forceful agents within
it.
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Figure 2: The barbell graph with n1 = 8 nodes in each bell and n2 = 4. There is a single
forceful link, represented by a directed link in the left bell.
Definition 4. Let G = (N ,A) be an undirected graph with edge {i, j} weight given by
wij. The minimum relative cut value between a and b, denoted by cab, is defined as
cab = inf
{ ∑
{i,j}∈A
i∈S,j∈Sc
wij | S ⊂ N , a ∈ S, b /∈ S
}
.
We refer to the cut that achieves the minimum in this optimization problem as the
minimum relative cut.
The next theorem uses the extremal characterization of the mean commute times
presented in Appendix D, Lemma 11, to provide bounds on the mean commute times in
terms of minimum relative cut values.
Theorem 10. Let G = (N ,A) be the social network graph induced by the social network
matrix T and consider a Markov chain with transition matrix T . For any a, b ∈ N , the
mean commute time between a and b satisfies
n
cab
≤ mab +mba ≤ n
2
cab
, (30)
where cab is the minimum relative cut value between a and b (cf. Definition 4).
Proof. For the lower bound we exploit the extremal characterization of the mean com-
mute time given by Eq. (54) in Lemma 11. For any S ⊂ N containing a and not
containing b, pick the function gS as follows:
gS(i) =
{
0, i ∈ S;
1, otherwise.
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The function g is feasible for the maximization problem in Eq. (54). Hence,
mab +mba ≥
[
E(gS, gS)
]−1
=
(∑
i,j
Tij
)[1
2
∑
i,j
Tij
(
gS(i)− gS(j)
)2]−1
= n
[∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Sc
Tij
(
gS(i)− gS(j)
)2]−1
=
n∑
i∈S
∑
j∈Sc Tij
, for all S ⊂ N , a ∈ S, b /∈ S.
The tightest lower bound can be obtained by taking the largest right-hand side in the
above relation, which gives the desired lower bound.
For the upper bound, similar to Proposition 2 in Chapter 4 of [2], we use the second
characterization of the mean commute time presented in Lemma 11. Note that any unit
flow from a to b is feasible in the minimization problem in Eq. (55). Max-flow min-cut
theorem implies that there exists a flow f of size cab from a to b such that |f ∗ij| ≤ Tij for
all edges {i, j} ∈ A. Therefore, there exists a unit flow f = (f ∗/cab) from a to b such
that |fij| ≤ Tij/cab for all edges {i, j}. By deleting flows around cycles we may assume
that
n∑
l=1
|fkl| ≤
{
1, if k = a, b,
2, otherwise.
(31)
Therefore, by invoking Lemma 11 from Appendix D, we obtain
mab +mba ≤
(∑
i,j
Tij
) ∑
{i,j}∈A
f 2ij
Tij
≤ n
cab
∑
{i,j}∈A
|fij |
≤ n
2
cab
,
where the last inequality follows from (31).
The minimum relative cut for the barbell graph in Example 3 is given by cut C1 with
relative cut value O(1). An alternative relative cut between the forceful and influenced
agents that partitions the left bell is cut C3, which has relative cut value O(n), and
therefore yields a tighter bound on the mean commute times. Comparing cut C1 to cut
C3, we observe that C3 is a balanced cut, i.e., it partitions the graph into parts each with
a fraction of the total number of nodes, while cut C1 is not balanced. In order to avoid
unbalanced cuts, we introduce the notion of a normalized relative cut between two nodes
which is a generalization of the normalized cut presented in Definition 3.
Definition 5. Consider a Markov chain with set of states N , transition probability
matrix Z, and stationary distribution π. The minimum normalized relative cut value
between a and b, denoted by ρab, is defined as
ρab = inf
S⊂N
{ Q(S, Sc)
π(S)π(Sc)
| a ∈ S, b /∈ S
}
,
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where Q(A,B) =
∑
i∈A,j∈B πiZij , and π(S) =
∑
i∈S πi. We refer to the cut that achieves
the minimum in this optimization problem as the minimum normalized relative cut.
The next theorem provides a bound on the mean commute time between two nodes
a and b as a function of the minimum normalized relative cut value between a and b.
Theorem 11. Consider a Markov chain with set of states N , transition probability
matrix Z, and uniform stationary distribution. For any a, b ∈ N , we have
mab +mba ≤ 3n logn
ρab
,
where ρab is the minimum normalized relative cut value between a and b (cf. Definition
5).
Proof. We present a generalization of the proof of Lemma 3 by Aldous and Fill [2], for
the notion of normalized relative cuts. The proof relies on the characterization of the
mean commute time given by Lemma 11 in Appendix D. For a function 0 ≤ g ≤ 1 with
g(a) = 0 and g(b) = 1, order the nodes as a = 1, 2, . . . , n = b so that g is increasing.
The Dirichlet form (cf. Definition 8) can be written as
E(g, g) =
∑
i
∑
k>i
πiZik
(
g(k)− g(i))2
≥
∑
i
∑
k>i
∑
i≤j<k
πiZik
(
g(j + 1)− g(j))2
=
n−1∑
j=1
(
g(j + 1)− g(j))2Q(Aj, Acj)
≥
n−1∑
j=1
(
g(j + 1)− g(j))2ρabπ(Aj)π(Acj), (32)
where Aj = {1, 2, . . . , j}, and the last inequality is true by Definition 5. On the other
hand, we have
1 = g(b)− g(a) =
n−1∑
j=1
(
g(j + 1)− g(j))(ρabπ(Aj)π(Acj)) 12(ρabπ(Aj)π(Acj))− 12 .
Using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and Eq. (32), we obtain
1
E(g, g) ≤
1
ρab
n−1∑
j=1
1
π(Aj)π(Acj)
. (33)
But π(Aj) = j/n, because the stationary distribution of the Markov chain is uniform.
Thus,
n−1∑
j=1
1
π(Aj)π(Acj)
=
n−1∑
j=1
n2
j(n− j) ≤ 3n logn.
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Therefore, by applying the above relation to Eq. (33) we conclude
1
E(g, g) ≤
3n log n
ρab
.
The above relation is valid for every function g feasible for the maximization problem
in Eq. (54). Hence, the desired result follows from the extremal characterization of the
mean commute time given by Lemma 11.
Note that the minimum normalized cut value of a Markov chain in Definition 3 can
be related to normalized relative cut values as follows:
ρ = inf
a6=b∈N
{ρab}.
Therefore, the upper bound given in Theorem 11 for the mean commute time is always
tighter than that provided in Lemma 3.
Let us now examine our new characterization in the context of Example 3. The
minimum normalized relative cut is given by cut C2 with (normalized relative cut) value
O(1). Despite the fact that C2 is a balanced cut with respect to the entire graph, it
is not a balanced cut in the left bell. Therefore, it yields a worse upper bound on
mean commute times compared to cut C3 [which has value O(n)]. These considerations
motivate us to consider balanced cuts within subsets of the original graph. In the
following we obtain tighter bounds on the mean commute times by considering relative
cuts in a subset of the original graph.
Definition 6. Consider a weighted undirected graph, (N ,A), with edge {i, j} weight
given by wij. For any S ⊆ N , we define the subgraph of (N ,A) with respect to S as
a weighted undirected graph, denoted by (S,AS), where AS contains all edges of the
original graph connecting nodes in S with the following weights
w¯ij =
{
wij, i 6= j;
wii +
∑
k∈Sc wik, i = j.
The next lemma uses the Monotonicity Law presented in Appendix D, Lemma 12 to
relate the mean commute times within a subgraph to the mean commute times of the
original graph.
Lemma 4. Let G = (N,A) be an undirected graph with edge {i, j} weight given by
wij. Consider a Markov chain induced by this graph and denote the mean first passage
times between states i and j by mij . We fix nodes a, b ∈ N , and S ⊆ N containing a
and b. Consider a subgraph of (N,A) with respect to S (cf. Definition 6) and let m¯ij
denote the mean first passage time between states i and j for the Markov chain induced
by this subgraph. We have,
mab +mba ≤ w
w(S)
(m¯ab + m¯ba),
where w is the total edge weight of the original graph, and w(S) is the total edge weight
of the subgraph, i.e., w(S) =
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈N wij.
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Proof. Consider an undirected graph (N ,A) with modified edge weights w˜ij given by
w˜ij =


wij, i 6= j ∈ S, or i 6= j ∈ Sc ;
0, i ∈ S, j ∈ Sc;
wii +
∑
k∈Sc wik, i = j.
Hence, w˜ij ≤ wij for all i 6= j, but the total edge weight w remains unchanged. By
Monotonicity Law (cf. Lemma 12), the mean commute time in the original graph is
bounded by that of the modified graph, i.e.,
mab +mba ≤ m˜ab + m˜ba. (34)
The mean commute time in the modified graph can be characterized using Lemma
11 in terms of the Dirichlet form defined in Definition 8. In particular,
(m˜ab + m˜ba)
−1 = inf
0≤g≤1
{ 1
w
∑
i,j∈N
w˜ij
(
g˜(i)− g˜(j))2 : g(a) = 0, g(b) = 1}
= inf
0≤g≤1
{ 1
w
∑
i,j∈S
wij
(
g˜(i)− g˜(j))2 : g(a) = 0, g(b) = 1}
+ inf
0≤g≤1
{ 1
w
∑
i,j∈Sc
wij
(
g˜(i)− g˜(j))2}
=
w(S)
w
inf
0≤g≤1
{∑
i,j∈S
w¯ij
w(S)
(
g˜(i)− g˜(j))2 : g(a) = 0, g(b) = 1}
=
w(S)
w
(m¯ab + m¯ba)
−1,
where the second equality holds by definition of w˜, and the last equality is given by
definition of w¯, and the extremal characterization of the mean commute time in the
subgraph. The desired result is established by combining the above relation with (34).
Theorem 12. Let G = (N ,A) be the social network graph induced by the social network
matrix T and consider a Markov chain with transition matrix T . For any a, b ∈ N , and
any S ⊆ N containing a and b, we have
mab +mba ≤ 3n log |S|
ρab(S)
,
where ρab(S) is the minimum normalized cut value between a and b on the subgraph of
(N ,A) with respect to S, i.e.,
ρab(S) = inf
S′⊂S
|S|
∑
i∈S′,j∈S\S′ Tij
|S ′| · |S \ S ′| . (35)
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Proof. By Lemma 4, we have
mab +mba ≤ w
w(S)
(m¯ab + m¯ba)
=
n
|S|(m¯ab + m¯ba), (36)
where m¯ab is the mean first passage time on the subgraph (S,AS).
On the other hand, Definition 6 implies that for the subgraph (S,AS), we have for
every i ∈ S ∑
k∈S
w¯ik =
∑
k∈S\{i}
w¯ik + w¯ii =
∑
k∈N
wik =
∑
k∈N
Tik = 1.
Hence, the stationary distribution of the Markov chain on the subgraph is uniform.
Therefore, we can apply Lemma 11 to relate the mean commute time within the subgraph
(S,AS) to its normalized relative cuts, i.e.,
m¯ab + m¯ba ≤ 3|S| log |S|
ρab(S)
,
where ρab(S) is the minimum normalized cut between a and b given by Definition 5 on
the subgraph. Since the stationary distribution of the random walk on the subgraph is
uniform, we can rewrite ρab(S) as in (35). Combining the above inequality with Eq. (36)
establishes the theorem.
Theorem 12 states that if the local neighborhood around the forceful links are highly
connected, the mean commute times between the forceful and the influenced agents
will be small, implying a smaller excess influence for all agents, hence limited spread of
misinformation in the society. The economic intuition for this result is similar to that for
our main characterization theorems: forceful agents get (their limited) information intake
from their local neighborhoods. When these local neighborhoods are also connected
to the rest of the network, forceful agents will be indirectly influenced by the rest of
the society and this will limit the spread of their (potentially extreme) opinions. In
contrast, when their local neighborhoods obtain most of their information from the
forceful agents, the opinions of these forceful agents will be reinforced (rather than
moderated) and this can significantly increase their excess influence and the potential
spread of misinformation.
Let us revisit Example 3, and apply the result of Theorem 12 where the selected
subgraph is the left cluster of nodes. The left bell is approximately a complete graph.
We observe that the minimum normalized cut in the subgraph would be of the form of
C3 in Figure 2, and hence the upper bound on the mean commute time between i and j
is O(n logn), which is close to the mean commute time on a complete graph of size n.
Note that it is possible to obtain the tightest upper bound on mean commute time
between two nodes by minimizing the bound in Theorem 12 over all subgraphs S of the
social network graph. However, exhaustive search over all subgraphs is not appealing
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from a computational point of view. Intuitively, for any two particular nodes, the goal
is to identify whether such nodes are highly connected by identifying a cluster of nodes
containing them, or a bottleneck that separates them. In the following section we present
a hierarchical clustering method to obtain such a cluster using a recursive approach.
5.4.1 Graph Clustering
We next present a graph clustering method to provide tighter bounds on the mean
commute time between two nodes a and b by systematically searching over subgraphs S
of the social network graph that would yield improved normalized cut values. The goal
of this exercise is again to improve the bounds on the term (mik −mjk) in Eq. (22) in
Theorem 7.
The following algorithm is based on successive graph cutting using the notion of
minimum normalized cut value defined in Definition 3. This approach is similar to
the graph partitioning approach of Shi and Malik [34] applied to image segmentation
problems.
Algorithm 1. Fix nodes a, b on the social network graph (N ,A). Perform the following
steps:
1. k = 0, Sk = N .
2. Define ρk as
ρk = inf
S⊂Sk
|Sk|
∑
i∈S,j∈Sk\S
Tij
|S| · |Sk \ S| ,
with S∗k as an optimal solution.
3. If a, b ∈ S∗k , then Sk+1 = S∗k; k ← k + 1; Goto 2.
4. If a, b ∈ Sk \ S∗k, then Sk+1 = Sk \ S∗k; k ← k + 1; Goto 2.
5. Return 3n log |Sk|
ρk
.
Figure 3 illustrates the steps of Algorithm 1 for a highly clustered graph. Each of the
regions in Figure 3 demonstrate a highly connected subgraph. We observe that the global
cut given by S1 does not separate a and b, so it need not give a tight characterization of
the bottleneck between a and b. Nevertheless, S1 gives a better estimate of the cluster
containing a and b. Repeating the above steps, the cluster size reduces until we obtain
a normalized cut separating a and b. By Theorem 12, this cut provides a bound on
the mean commute time between a and b that characterizes the bottleneck between
such nodes. So far, we have seen in this example and Example 2 that graph clustering
via recursive partitioning can monotonically improve upon the bounds on the excess
influence (cf. Theorem 12). Unfortunately, that is not always the case as discussed in
the following example. In fact, we need further assumptions on the graph in order to
obtain monotone improvement via graph clustering.
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Figure 3: Graph clustering algorithm via successive graph cutting using normalized
minimum cut criterion.
Figure 4: Social network graph with a central hub
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Example 4. Consider a social network graph of size n depicted in Figure 4. The central
region is a complete graph of size n/2. Each of the k clusters on the cycle is a complete
graph of size n/(2k), which is connected to the central hub via edges of total weight h.
Moreover, the clusters on the cycle are connected with total edge weight r.
If r ≥ kh/8, then C0 would be the minimum normalized cut rather than cuts of the
form C1. Hence, ρ0 in step 2 of Algorithm 1 is given by
ρ0 = n
kh
n
2
· n
2
=
4kh
n
.
After removing the central cluster, we obtain C2 as the minimum normalized cut
over the cycle, with the following value
ρ1 =
n
2
2r
n
4
· n
4
=
16r
n
.
Therefore, we conclude that ρ1 < ρ0 if and only if
kh
8
< r < kh
4
, i.e., the upperbound
obtained by Algorithm 1 on the mean commute time between a and b, is not smaller than
that of Lemma 3. That is because by removing the central cluster, we have eliminated
the possibility of reaching the destination via shortcuts of the central hub, and the only
way to reach the destination is to walk through the cycle.
Next, we show that the bounds given by Algorithm 1 are monotonically improving,
if the successive cuts are disjoint.
Definition 7. Consider an undirected graph (N ,A). The cuts defined by S1, S2 ⊆ N
are disjoint with respect to N if
δ(S1) ∩ δ(S2) = ∅,
where
δ(S) =
{
{i, j} ∈ A | i ∈ S, j ∈ Sc
}
.
Theorem 13. Let ρk and Sk be generated by the k
th iteration of running Algorithm
1 on the social network graph (N ,A). If the cuts corresponding to Sk+1 and Sk+2 are
disjoint with respect to Sk, then ρk+1 > ρk.
Proof. By definition of ρk in step 2 of Algorithm 1, we have for Sk+2 ⊆ Sk
ρk = |Sk|
∑
i∈Sk+1,j∈Sk\Sk+1
Tij
|Sk+1| · |Sk \ Sk+1| ≤ |Sk|
∑
i∈Sk+2,j∈Sk\Sk+2
Tij
|Sk+2| · |Sk \ Sk+2| . (37)
But Sk+1 and Sk+2 are disjoint with respect to Sk, and Sk+2 ⊆ Sk+1 ⊆ Sk. It is
straightforward to show that{
{i, j} ∈ A | i ∈ Sk+2, j ∈ Sk \ Sk+1
}
⊆ δ(Sk+1) ∩ δ(Sk+2) = ∅,
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which implies∑
i∈Sk+2,j∈Sk\Sk+2
Tij =
∑
i∈Sk+2,j∈Sk\Sk+1
Tij +
∑
i∈Sk+2,j∈Sk+1\Sk+2
Tij =
∑
i∈Sk+2,j∈Sk+1\Sk+2
Tij.
Therefore, by combining the above relation with (37) and the definition of ρk+1, we
obtain
ρk+1
ρk
≥
(
|Sk+1|
∑
i∈Sk+2,j∈Sk+1\Sk+2
Tij
|Sk+2| · |Sk+1 \ Sk+2|
)(
|Sk|
∑
i∈Sk+2,j∈Sk+1\Sk+2
Tij
|Sk+2| · |Sk \ Sk+2|
)−1
=
|Sk+1| · |Sk \ Sk+2|
|Sk| · |Sk+1 \ Sk+2| =
|Sk+1|
(|Sk \ Sk+1|+ |Sk+1 \ Sk+2|)
|Sk+1 \ Sk+2|
(|Sk+1|+ |Sk \ Sk+1|) (38)
=
(
1 +
|Sk \ Sk+1|
|Sk+1 \ Sk+2|
)(
1 +
|Sk \ Sk+1|
|Sk+1|
)−1
> 1,
where (38) holds because Sk+2 ⊆ Sk+1 ⊆ Sk, and the last inequality is true because
Sk+1 \ Sk+2 ⊆ Sk+1, and Sk+2 is nonempty.
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzed the spread of misinformation in large societies. Our analysis is
motivated by the widespread differences in beliefs across societies and more explicitly,
the presence of many societies in which beliefs that appear to contradict the truth can
be widely held. We argued that the possibility that such misinformation can arise and
spread is the manifestation of the natural tension between information aggregation and
misinformation spreading in the society.
We modeled a society as a social network of agents communicating (meeting) with
each other. Each individual holds a belief represented by a scalar. Individuals meet
pairwise and exchange information, which is modeled as both individuals adopting the
average of their pre-meeting beliefs. When all individuals engage in this type of infor-
mation exchange, the society will be able to aggregate the initial information held by all
individuals. This effective information aggregation forms the benchmark against which
we compared the possible spread of misinformation.
Misinformation is introduced by allowing some agents to be “forceful,” meaning that
they influence the beliefs of (some) of the other individuals they meet, but do not
change their own opinion. When the influence of forceful agents is taken into account,
this defines a stochastic process for belief evolution, and our analysis exploited the fact
that this stochastic process (Markov chain) can be decomposed into a part induced by
the social network matrix and a part corresponding to the influence matrix.
Under the assumption that even forceful agents obtain some information (however
infrequent) from some others, we first show that beliefs in this class of societies converge
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to a consensus among all individuals (under some additional weak regularity conditions).
This consensus value is a random variable, and the bulk of our analysis characterizes its
behavior, in particular, providing bounds on how much this consensus can differ from
the efficient information aggregation benchmark.
We presented three sets of results. Our first set of results quantify the extent of mis-
information in the society as a function of the number and properties of forceful agents
and the mixing properties of the Markov chain induced by the social network matrix.
In particular, we showed that social network matrices with large second eigenvalues, or
that correspond to fast-mixing graphs, will place tight bounds on the extent of misinfor-
mation. The intuition for this result is that in such societies individuals that ultimately
have some influence on the beliefs of forceful agents rapidly inherit the beliefs of the rest
of the society and thus the beliefs of forceful agents ultimately approach to those of the
rest of the society and cannot have a large impact on the consensus beliefs. The extreme
example is provided by expander graphs, where, when the number and the impact of
forceful agents is finite, the extent of misinformation becomes arbitrarily small as the
size of the society becomes large. In contrast, the worst outcomes are obtained when
there are several forceful agents and forceful agents themselves update their beliefs only
on the basis of information they obtain from individuals most likely to have received
their own information previously (i.e., when the graph is slow-mixing).
Our second set of results exploit more explicitly the location of forceful agents within
a social network. A given social network will lead to very different types of limiting
behavior depending on the context in which the forceful agents are located. We provided
a tight characterization for graphs with the forceful essential edges, that is, graphs
representing societies in which a forceful agent links two disconnected clusters. Such
graphs approximate situations in which forceful agents, such as media outlets or political
leaders, themselves obtain all of their information from a small group of other individuals.
The interesting and striking result in this case is that the excess influence of all of the
members of the small group are the same, even if some of them are not directly linked
to forceful agents. We then extended these findings to more general societies using the
notion of information bottlenecks.
Our third set of results provide new efficient graph clustering algorithms for comput-
ing tighter bounds on excess influence.
We view our paper as a first attempt in quantifying misinformation in society. As
such, we made several simplifying assumptions and emphasized the characterization re-
sults to apply for general societies. Many areas of future investigation stem from this
endeavor. First, it is important to consider scenarios in which learning and information
updating are, at least partly, Bayesian. Our non-Bayesian framework is a natural start-
ing point, both because it is simpler to analyze and because the notion of misinformation
is more difficult to introduce in Bayesian models. Nevertheless, game theoretic models
of communication can be used for analyzing situations in which a sender may explicitly
try to mislead one or several receivers. Second, one can combine a model of communica-
tion along the lines of our setup with individuals taking actions with immediate payoff
consequences and also updating on the basis of their payoffs. Misinformation will then
LIDS Report 2812 44
have short-run payoff consequences, but whether it will persist or not will depend on
how informative payoffs are and on the severity of its short-run payoff consequences.
Third, it would be useful to characterize what types of social networks are more robust
to the introduction of misinformation and how agents might use simple rules in order to
avoid misinformation.
Finally, our approach implies that the society (social network) will ultimately reach
a consensus, even though this consensus opinion is a random variable. In practice, there
are widespread differences in beliefs in almost all societies. There is little systematic
analysis of such differences in beliefs in the literature at the moment, and this is clearly
an important and challenging area for future research. Our framework suggests two
fruitful lines of research. First, although a stochastic consensus is eventually reached in
our model, convergence can be very slow. Thus characterizing the rate of convergence
to consensus in this class of models might provide insights about what types of societies
and which sets of issues should lead to such belief differences. Second, if we relax the
assumption that even forceful agents necessarily obtain some (albeit limited) information
from others, thus removing the “no man is an island” feature, then it can be shown that
the society will generally not reach a consensus. Nevertheless, characterizing differences
in opinions in this case is difficult and requires a different mathematical approach. We
plan to investigate this issue in future work.
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Appendix A
Preliminary Lemmas, Sections 3 and 4
This appendix presents two lemmas that will be used in proving the convergence of
agent beliefs (i.e., Theorem 1) and in establishing properties of the social network matrix
T in Appendix C.
The first lemma provides conditions under which a nonnegative n × n matrix M is
primitive, i.e., there exists a positive integer k such that all entries of the kth power of
M , Mk, are positive (see [33]). The lemma also provides a positive uniform lower bound
on the entries of the matrix Mk as a function of the entries of M and the properties
of the graph induced by the positive entries of matrix M . A version of this lemma was
established in [28]. We omit the proof here since it is not directly relevant to the rest of
the analysis.
Lemma 5. Let H be a nonnegative n×n matrix that satisfies the following conditions:
(a) The diagonal entries of H are positive, i.e., Hii > 0 for all i.
(b) Let E denote a set of edges such that the graph (N , E) is connected. For all
(i, j) ∈ E , the entry Hij is positive, i.e., E ⊂ {(i, j) | Hij > 0}.
Let d denote the maximum shortest path length between any i, j in the induced graph
(N , E), and η > 0 be a scalar given by
η = min
{
min
i∈N
Hii, min
(i,j)∈E
Hij
}
.
Then, we have
[Hd]ij ≥ ηd for all i, j.
The second lemma considers a sequence z(k) generated by a linear time-varying
update rule, i.e., given some z(0), the sequence {z(k)} is generated by
z(k) = H(k)z(k − 1) for all k ≥ 0,
where H(k) is a stochastic matrix for all k ≥ 0. We introduce the matrices Φ˜(k, s) =
H(k)H(k − 1) . . .H(s) to relate z(k + 1) to z(s) for s ≤ k, i.e.,
z(k + 1) = Φ˜(k, s)z(s).
The lemma shows that, under some assumptions on the entries of the matrix Φ˜(k, s), the
disagreement in the components of z(k), defined as the difference between the maximum
and minimum components of z(k), decreases with k and provides a bound on the amount
of decrease.
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Lemma 6. Let {H(k)} be a sequence of n×n stochastic matrices. Given any z(0) ∈ Rn,
let {z(k)} be a sequence generated by the linear update rule
z(k) = H(k)z(k − 1) for all k ≥ 0. (39)
Assume that there exists some integer B > 0 and scalar θ > 0 such that
[Φ˜(s+B − 1, s)]ij ≥ θ for all i, j, and s ≥ 0.
For all k ≥ 0, define M(k) ∈ R and m(k) ∈ R as follows:
M(k) = max
i∈N
zi(k), m(k) = min
i∈N
zi(k). (40)
Then, for all s ≥ 0, we have nθ ≤ 1 and
M(s +B)−m(s+B) ≤ (1− nθ)(M(s)−m(s)).
Proof. In view of the linear update rule (39), we have for all i,
zi(s+B) =
n∑
j=1
[Φ˜(s+B − 1, s)]ij zj(s) for all s ≥ 0.
We rewrite the preceding relation as
zi(s+B) =
n∑
j=1
θzj(s) +
n∑
j=1
[Φˆ(s+B − 1, s)]ij zj(s), (41)
where [Φˆ(s + B − 1, s)]ij = [Φ˜(s + B − 1, s)]ij − θ for all i, j. Since by assumption
[Φ˜(s+B − 1, s)]ij ≥ θ for all i, j, we have
[Φˆ(s+B − 1, s)]ij ≥ 0 for all i, j.
Moreover, since the matrices H(k) are stochastic, the product matrix Φ(s+B − 1, s) is
also stochastic, and therefore we have
n∑
j=1
[Φˆ(s+B − 1, s)]ij = 1− nθ for all i.
From the preceding two relations, we obtain 1− nθ ≥ 0 and
(1− nθ)m(s) ≤
n∑
j=1
[Φˆ(s+B − 1, s)]ij zj(k) ≤ (1− nθ)M(s),
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where m(s) and M(s) are defined in Eq. (40). Combining this relation with Eq. (41),
we obtain for all i
(1− nθ)m(s) ≤ zi(s+B)−
n∑
j=1
θzj(s) ≤ (1− nθ)M(s).
Since this relation holds for all i, we have
(1− nθ)m(s) ≤ m(s+B)−
n∑
j=1
θzj(s),
M(s +B)−
n∑
j=1
θzj(s) ≤ (1− nθ)M(s),
from which we obtain
M(s +B)−m(s+B) ≤ (1− nθ)(M(s)−m(s)) for all s ≥ 0.
Appendix B
Properties of the Mean Interaction and Transition Matrices,
Sections 3 and 4
We establish some properties of the mean interaction matrix W˜ and the transition
matrices Φ(k, s) under the assumptions discussed in Section 2.2. Recall that transition
matrices are given by
Φ(k, s) = W (k)W (k − 1) · · ·W (s+ 1)W (s) for all k and s with k ≥ s, (42)
with Φ(k, k) = W (k) for all k. Also note that the mean interaction matrix is given by
W˜ = E[W (k)] for all k. In view of the belief update model (4)-(5), the entries of the
matrix W˜ can be written as follows. For all i ∈ N , the diagonal entries are given by
[W˜ ]ii = 1−
∑
j 6=i(pij + pji)
n
+
1
n
[∑
j 6=i
pij
(βij
2
+ αijǫ+ γij
)
+
∑
j 6=i
pji
(βji
2
+ αji + γji
)]
,
(43)
and for all i 6= j ∈ N , the off-diagonal entries are given by
[W˜ ]ij =
1
n
[
pij
(βij
2
+ αij(1− ǫ)
)
+ pji
βji
2
]
. (44)
Using the assumptions of Section 2.2, Lemma 5, and the explicit expressions for the
entries of the matrix W˜ , we have the following result.
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Lemma 7. Let d be the maximum shortest path length between any i, j in the graph
(N , E) [cf. Eq. (3)], and η be a scalar given by
η = min
{
min
i∈N
[W˜ ]ii, min
(i,j)∈E
[W˜ ]ij
}
, (45)
[cf. Eqs. (43) and (44)].
(a) The scalar η is positive and we have
[W˜ d]ij ≥ ηd for all i, j.
(b) We have
P
{
[Φ(s + d− 1, s)]ij ≥ η
d
2
}
≥ η
d
2
for all s ≥ 0, i, and j.
Proof. (a) We show that under Assumptions 1 and 3, the mean interaction matrix W˜
has positive diagonal entries and the set E [cf. Eq. (2)] is a subset of the link set induced
by the positive elements of W˜ . Together with the Connectivity assumption, part (a)
then follows from Lemma 5.
By Assumption 1, we have for all i,
∑
j 6=i pij = 1 and pij ≥ 0 for all j. This implies
that
∑
j 6=i pji ≤ n− 1 and therefore
1−
∑
j 6=i(pij + pji)
n
≥ 0 for all i.
Since
∑
j 6=i pij = 1 for all i, there exists some j such that pij > 0, i.e., (i, j) ∈ E . In view
of the information exchange model, we have βij > 0 or αij > 0 or γij > 0, implying that
pij
(βij
2
+ αijǫ+ γij
)
> 0.
Combining the preceding two relations with Eq. (43), we obtain
[W˜ ]ii > 0 for all i. (46)
We next show that for any link (i, j) in the set E , the entry [W˜ ]ij is positive, i.e.,
E ⊂ {(i, j) | [W˜ ]ij > 0}.
For any (i, j) ∈ E , we have pij > 0, and therefore βij +αij > 0 (cf. Assumption 3). This
implies that
pij
(βij
2
+ αij(1− ǫ)
)
> 0,
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which by Eq. (44) yields [W˜ ]ij > 0. Together with Eq. (46), this shows that the scalar
η defined in (45) is positive. By Assumption 2, the graph (N , E) is connected. Using
the identification H = W˜ in Lemma 5, we see that the conditions of this lemma are
satisfied, establishing part (a).
(b) For all i, j and s ≥ 0, we have
P
{
[Φ(s + d− 1, s)]ij ≥ η
d
2
}
= P
{
1− [Φ(s + d− 1, s)]ij ≤ 1− η
d
2
}
= 1− P
{
1− [Φ(s+ d− 1, s)]ij ≥ 1− η
d
2
}
. (47)
The Markov Inequality states that for any nonnegative random variable Y with a finite
mean E[Y ], the probability that the outcome of the random variable Y exceeds any
given scalar δ > 0 satisfies
P{Y ≥ δ} ≤ E[Y ]
δ
.
By applying the Markov inequality to the random variable 1− [Φ(s+ d− 1, s)]ij [which
is nonnegative and has a finite expectation in view of the stochasticity of the matrix
Φ(s+ d− 1, s) for all s ≥ 0], we obtain
P
{
1− [Φ(s + d− 1, s)]ij ≥ 1− η
d
2
}
≤ E[1− [Φ(s+ d− 1, s)]ij]
1− ηd/2 .
Combining with Eq. (47), this yields
P
{
[Φ(s + d− 1, s)]ij ≥ η
d
2
}
≥ 1− E[1− [Φ(s+ d− 1, s)]ij]
1− ηd/2 . (48)
By the definition of the transition matrices [cf. Eq. (42)], we have
E[Φ(s + d− 1, s)] = E[W (s+ d− 1)W (s+ d− 2) · · ·W (s)] = W˜ d,
where the second equality follows from the assumption that W (k) is independent and
identically distributed over k. By part (a), this implies that
[E[Φ(s + d− 1, s)]]ij ≥ ηd for all i, j,
which combined with Eq. (48) yields
P
{
[Φ(s + d− 1, s)]ij ≥ η
d
2
}
≥ 1− 1− η
d
1− ηd/2 =
ηd/2
1− ηd/2 ≥
ηd
2
,
establishing the desired result.
The next two lemmas establish properties of transition matrices.
Lemma 8.
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(a) [Φ(k, s)]ii ≥ ǫk−s+1 for all k and s with k ≥ s, and all i ∈ N with probability one.
(b) Assume that there exist integers K,B ≥ 1 and a scalar ξ > 0 such that for some
s ≥ 0 and k ∈ {0, . . . , K}, we have
[Φ(s+ (k + 1)B − 1, s+ kB)]ij ≥ ξ for some i, j.
Then,
[Φ(s+KB − 1, s)]ij ≥ ξǫK−1 with probability one.
Proof. (a) We let s be arbitrary and prove the relation by induction on k. By the
definition of the transition matrices [cf. Eq. (42)], we have Φ(s, s) = W (s). Thus, the
relation [Φ(k, s)]ii ≥ ǫk−s+1 holds for k = s from the definition of the update matrix
W (k) [cf. Eq. (5)]. Suppose now that the relation holds for some k > s and consider
[Φ(k + 1, s)]ii. We have
[Φ(k + 1, s)]ii =
n∑
h=1
[W (k + 1)]ih[Φ(k, s)]hi ≥ [W (k + 1)]ii[Φ(k, s)]ii ≥ ǫk−s+2,
where the first inequality follows from the nonnegativity of the entries of Φ(k, s), and
the second inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis.
(b) For any s ≥ 0, we have
[Φ(s +KB − 1, s)]ij =
n∑
h=1
[Φ(s +KB − 1, s+ (k + 1)B)]ih[Φ(s+ (k + 1)B − 1, s)]hj
≥ [Φ(s+KB − 1, s+ (k + 1)B)]ii[Φ(s + (k + 1)B − 1, s)]ij
≥ ǫ(K−k−1)B[Φ(s + (k + 1)B − 1, s)]ij,
where the last inequality follows from part (a). Similarly,
[Φ(s + (k + 1)B − 1, s)]ij =
n∑
h=1
[Φ(s + (k + 1)B − 1, s+ kB)]ih[Φ(s + kB − 1, s)]hj
≥ [Φ(s + (k + 1)B − 1, s+ kB)]ij [Φ(s + kB − 1, s)]jj
≥ ξǫkB,
where the second inequality follows from the assumption [Φ(s+(k+1)B−1, s+kB)]ij ≥ ξ
and part (a). Combining the preceding two relations yields the desired result.
Lemma 9. We have
P
{
[Φ(s+ n2d− 1, s)]ij ≥ η
d
2
ǫn
2−1, for all i, j
}
≥
(
ηd
2
)n2
for all s ≥ 0,
where the scalar η > 0 and the integer d are the constants defined in Lemma 7.
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Proof. Consider a particular ordering of the elements of an n × n matrix and let kij ∈
{0, . . . , n2 − 1} denote the unique index for element (i, j). From Lemma 8(b), we have
P
{
[Φ(s+ n2d− 1, s)]ij ≥ η
d
2
ǫn
2−1, for all i, j
}
≥ P
{
[Φ(s + (kij + 1)d− 1, s+ kijd)]ij ≥ η
d
2
, for all i, j
}
=
∏
(i,j)
P
{
Φ(s+ (kij + 1)d− 1, s+ kijd)]ij ≥ η
d
2
}
≥
(
ηd
2
)n2
.
Here the second equality follows from the independence of the random events
{
Φ(s + (k + 1)d− 1, s+ kd)]ij ≥ η
d
2
}
over all k = 0, . . . , n2 − 1, and the last inequality follows from Lemma 7(b).
Appendix C
Properties of the Social Network Matrix, Section 4
The next lemma studies the properties of the social network matrix T . Note that
the entries of the matrix T can be written as follows: For all i ∈ N , the diagonal entries
are given by
[T ]ii = 1−
∑
j 6=i(pij + pji)
n
+
1
n
[∑
j 6=i
pij
(1− γij
2
+ γij
)
+
∑
j 6=i
pji
(1− γji
2
+ γji
)]
, (49)
and for all i 6= j ∈ N , the off-diagonal entries are given by
[T ]ij =
1
n
[
pij
1− γij
2
+ pji
1− γji
2
]
. (50)
Lemma 10. Let T be the social network matrix [cf. Eq. (9)]. Then, we have:
(a) The matrix T k converges to a stochastic matrix with identical rows 1
n
e as k goes
to infinity, i.e.,
lim
k→∞
T k =
1
n
ee′.
(b) For any z(0) ∈ Rn, let the sequence z(k) be generated by the linear update rule
z(k) = Tz(k − 1) for all k ≥ 0.
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For all k ≥ 0, define M(k) ∈ R and m(k) ∈ R as follows:
M(k) = max
i∈N
zi(k), m(k) = min
i∈N
zi(k).
Then, for all k ≥ 0, we have
M(k)−m(k) ≤ δk(M(0)−m(0)).
Here δ > 0 is a constant given by
δ = (1− nχd) 1d ,
χ = min
(i,j)∈E
{
1
n
[
pij
1− γij
2
+ pji
1− γji
2
]}
,
and d is the maximum shortest path length in the graph (N , E) [cf. Eq. (3)].
Proof. (a) By Assumption 1, we have for all i,
∑
j 6=i pij = 1 and pij ≥ 0 for all j. This
implies that
∑
j 6=i pji ≤ n− 1 and therefore
1−
∑
j 6=i(pij + pji)
n
≥ 0 for all i. (51)
Since
∑
j 6=i pij = 1 for all i, there exists some j such that pij > 0, i.e., (i, j) ∈ E . By
Assumption 3, this implies that βij + αij = 1 − γij > 0, showing that Tii > 0 for all i.
Similarly, for any (i, j) ∈ E , we have pij > 0 and therefore 1 − γij > 0, showing that
Tij > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ E . Using Eq. (51) in Eqs. (49) and (50), it follows that for all i
[T ]ii ≥ Tij for all j.
Thus, we can use Lemma 5 with the identification
χ = min
(i,j)∈E
{
1
n
[
pij
1− γij
2
+ pji
1− γji
2
]}
, (52)
and obtain
[T d]ij ≥ χd for all i, j, (53)
i.e., T is a primitive matrix and therefore the Markov Chain with transition probability
matrix T is regular. It follows from Theorem 3(a) that for any z(0) ∈ Rn, we have
lim
k→∞
T kz(0) = ez¯,
where z¯ is given by z¯ = π′z(0) for some probability vector π. Since T is a stochastic and
symmetric matrix, it is doubly stochastic. Denoting z(k) = T kz(0), this implies that
the average of the entries of the vector z(k) is the same for all k, i.e.,
1
n
n∑
i=1
zi(k) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
zi(0) for all k ≥ 0.
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Combining the preceding two relations, we obtain
lim
k→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
zi(k) = z¯ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
zi(0),
establishing the desired relation.
(b) In view of Eq. (53), we can use Lemma 6 with the identifications
H(k) = T, B = d, θ = χd,
where χ is defined in Eq. (52), and obtain
M(k)−m(k) ≤ (1− nχd) kd (M(0)−m(0)).
Appendix D
Characterization of the Mean Commute Time, Section 5
First, we characterize the mean commute time between two nodes for a random walk
on an undirected graph using Dirichlet principle and its dual, Thompson’s principle.
Definition 8. Consider a random walk on a weighted undirected graph (N ,A) with
weight wij associated to each edge {i, j}. Define the Dirichlet form E , as follows. For
functions g : N → R write
E(g, g) = 1
2
∑
i,j
wij
w
(
g(i)− g(j)
)2
,
where w =
∑
i,j wij is the total edge weight.
Lemma 11. Consider a random walk on a weighted undirected graph with weight wij
associated to each edge {i, j}. For mean commute time between distinct nodes a and b
we have,
mab +mba = sup
{
1
E(g, g) : 0 ≤ g ≤ 1, g(a) = 0, g(b) = 1
}
(54)
= w inf
{
1
2
∑
i,j
f 2ij
wij
: f is a unit flow from a to b
}
, (55)
where mab is the mean first passage time from a to b, and w is the total edge weight.
Proof. See Section 7.2 of [2].
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It is worth mentioning that the two forms of the mean commute time characterization
in Lemma 11 are dual of each other. The first form is a corollary of Dirichlet principle,
while the second is immediate result of Thompson’s principle. Using the electric circuit
analogy, we can think of function g(i) as potential associated to node i, and flow fij as
the current on edge {i, j} with resistance 1
wij
. The expressions in (55) are equivalent
descriptions of minimum energy dissipation in such electric network. Hence, we can
interpret the mean commute time between two particular nodes as the effective resistance
between such nodes in a resistive network. This allows us to use Monotonicity Law to
obtain simpler bounds for mean commute time.
Lemma 12. (Monotonicity Law) Let w˜ij ≤ wij be the edge-weights for two undi-
rected graphs. Then,
mav +mva ≤
(w
w˜
)
(m˜av + m˜va), for all a, v,
where w =
∑
i,j wij and w˜ =
∑
i,j w˜ij are the total edge weight.
Proof. Let f ∗ and f˜ ∗ be the optimal solutions of (55) for the original and modified
graphs, respectively. We can write
mav +mva =
w
2
∑
i,j
(f ∗ij)
2
wij
≤ w
2
∑
i,j
(f˜ ∗ij)
2
wij
≤ w
2
∑
i,j
(f˜ ∗ij)
2
w˜ij
=
(w
w˜
) w˜
2
∑
i,j
(f˜ ∗ij)
2
w˜ij
=
(w
w˜
)
(m˜av + m˜va),
where the first inequality follows from optimality of f ∗, and feasibility of f˜ ∗.
By the electric network analogy, Lemma 12 states that increasing resistances in a
circuit increases the effective resistance between any two nodes in the network. Mono-
tonicity law can be extremely useful in providing simple bounds for mean commute
times.
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